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Abstract
In the late 1990s the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans 
to operate an earth orbiting space station. For decades into the future the station is 
expected to play a dominant role in U.S. space research and in the commercialization of 
space. If the expectations are correct, then the station will be a complex of potentially 
valuable resources and services. Much sentiment exists within the government that the
allocation of those resources should be ba.Sed on some sort of market-oriented policy (a
more "business-like" approach). This paper is part of a larger project that is intended 
to ascertain what that policy might be. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1990s the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to 
operate an earth orbiting space station. For decades into the future the station is expected to play a 
dominant role in U.S. space research and in the commercialization of space. If the expectations are
correct, then the station will be a complex of potentially valuable resources and services. Much
sentiment exists within the government that the allocation of those resources should be based on 
some sort of market-oriented policy (a more "business-like" approach) . This paper is part of a 
larger project that is intended to ascertain what that policy might be. 
Laboratory experimental methods have played several roles in the larger project. For 
example, the design of an experiment requires a complete specification of the finest details of the 
policy and of the economic environment in which the policy will operate. The detailed focus 
demanded by the small-scale creation of the policies and environment raises questions that might 
never be asked until the actual environment is faced and when it is too late to generate thoughtful
answers. The very act of creating an experiment means that issues of timing, forms for gathering
and reporting information, methods of resolving conflicts and uncertainties, and other institutional 
details that give a policy life are specified in operational (as opposed to abstract) terms. This role of
experimental methods as a heuristic is well recognized by experimentalists (Plott 1987). 
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This report deals with an additional feature of experiments. The experiments provide a 
source of experience and data about how various policies might work. An experimental 
environment has been created that contains features and events that are believed will be present in 
the field space station environment. Implementation of policies in such a "testbed" environment 
provides a first-stage evaluation of the policies' performance properties. Presumably the first-stage 
testing will be followed by more advanced stages that incorporate more complicated environments 
and test any weaknesses the policies seem to exhibit. Follow-up studies should focus on variables 
that researchers feel might change the results. Laboratory research should be followed by simple 
field tests. Thus, the purpose of the study is to provide a first-stage evaluation of policies. In 
addition, the purpose is not only to answer questions but also to stimulate questions which might be
answered by second-stage and third-stage research. 
We recognize that this use of experiments might not conform to everyone's beliefs about 
the proper role of experimental methodology in economics. These experiments are complicated 
relative to other experiments found in the literature. We suspect, however, that the approach 
adopted here is not significantly different from the techniques that have evolved in engineering, 
medicine and other applied fields in which the basic principles governing phenomena cannot be
seen through the complexity. We are aware of no alternative methods for testing policies short of 
the actual field application. Cost and politics seem to preclude any son of field experiments in the 
case of a space station. Almost certainly no radical departure from historic policies will be 
implemented or even tried in the absence of data that suggest that the policy would work smoothly 
in a complex environment. We have been careful to contain the discussion and conclusions within 
this special-purpose experimental methodology. 
As will be outlined in the section that follows, this study is a comparison of four policies . 
For the most part the questions posed are very broad and reflect an attempt to decompose the even 
broader questions asked by those responsible for policy implementation: "will the policy work?"
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and "how will the policy work?" The environment is complex.  The economics is complex. The 
policies are complex. The principles and arguments used by economists appear to be abstract. A 
demonstration seems to be an answer to many different types of questions that such complexity
fosters. The list below is an attempt to isolate some of them. 
a. Does the policy lead to allocation decisions in the complex environment, or does it simply
grind to a halt? The weight of confusion, conflict, paperwork, etc. might lead to no decisions 
at all or possibly to so few decisions that the policy is impractical. 
b. Is the policy complete in the sense that imponant contingencies are anticipated? Because the
agents are human with their own perceptions, search strategies, etc . ,  the strategy spaces might
be much richer than imagined by the designers. Does the policy deal smoothly with
situations that were not anticipated by the policy designers? 
c .  I s  the quantitative performance of the policies that which is  predicted by such theory that 
exists? Are deviations from predictions of theories understandable in terms of those 
theories? Since the models are simplifications of the actual environment, errors due to 
simplification must be separated from more basic errors involving the principles that are at 
the foundation of the policy. If the theory seems substantially correct, then research can
proceed on the assumption that the theory will be reliable in more complex environments and 
that the understanding or intuition of possible policy behavior gained from theory is reliable. 
d. What is the comparative performance (efficiency) of the policies? Which policy is "best?"
Are the conclusions about relative efficiency sensitive to the particular environment? What
type of performance measures, other than efficiency, are appropriate for answering the
question? How would the policy perform (better or worse) if it is changed from the way i t
was implemented in the experiment?
Our experiments have been designed to directly answer these broad questions. In addition.
the experiments are to be used as a demonstration to inform those individuals who will implement
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allocation policies about the possible consequences of various policies. This purpose of our 
experiments was to provide a "nontechnical" presentation to those who must explain the details of a 
policy to a wide constituency. The only way we can provide the insight required by these 
individuals, so that they will have confidence in explaining (and understanding) the policies and the 
principles that might lead to their effects, is to participate in the policies. We will report on this 
aspect of our experiment below (section five). 
OVERVIEW 
The study is divided into nine major sections. The next section describes the economic
environment. Section four lists the policies to be studied. Section five specifies some models based 
on the behavioral principles that tend to guide economic thinking about the policies. Section six is 
a brief outline of the experimental design. Section seven is a discussion of the results that bear on 
policy evaluation. Section eight is a discussion of the results as they are related to the accuracy of 
the models in predicting the data generated by the experiments. The final section contains remarks 
that are reflections on the study. 
THE ENVIRONMENT (EXPERIMENT AL TESTBED)1
The economic environment reflects judgements about the types of relationships that will 
exist in the actual environment as seen by economists and engineers. Frequently these judgements 
reflect opinions held by one or more decision maker that some aspect will be present in the actual
enviromnent and will be a challenge to a policy. These judgements are reflected in the nature of
tradeoffs and uncertainties built into the experimental environment. A desire to be able to compute 
certain interesting magnitudes (e.g., competitive equilibria and efficient allocations) was also a 
consideration in the choice of environmental parameters. The limitations imposed by existing 
experimental technology were also important Other opinions about facts, theories, or the capacity 
1. For a detailed description of the environment, parameters, and timing for the experiments of this paper, see Porter (1987). 
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of experimental technology could have lead to a different environment. 
The economic environment designed for the experiments consists of a set of contingent
space station resources to be allocated to a group of seven agents. Each of the agents must commit 
some capital to design and develop a project (this is defined as a payload). Operation of the 
payload involved the use of space station resources to produce some output. We shall now discuss 
each of the elements of this environment in tum. 
Space Station Resources to be Allocated
station: 
The supply side of the environment consisted of three resources to be supplied by the 
1 . Launch of payloads to the station. This resource is called mass and the quantity
available isM.
2. Electric power supplied to payloads for operations. This resource is called power and
the quantity available is P.
3. Manpower supplied to payloads for operations. This resource is called hours and the
quantity available is H. 
These resources are subject to supply-side uncertainty. The amount of a resource available 
will be either rated capacity M , P , H or something less M; f.. , H . The parameters governing
uncertainty are described by the following notations and conditions:
[M with probability PM 
M = M with probability (1 - p M)
[f. with probability Pp 
P = P with probability (1 - Pp)
[H with probability PH 
H = ii with probability (1 - pH)
That is, "failures" of station resources are independent and result in a reduction in available station 
resource capacities. 
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We shall consider a simple set of co ntinge nt re source s (contracts) called prio rity contracts. 
A priority contract describes the order of dispatch of a resource. First priority resources in our 
environment are those that will be available in all states. Second priority are those that are 
available only if the station operates at full-rated capacity. We call M 1 = M pr ior ity 1 mass and
M 2 = M - M pr ior ity 2 mass. Similarly, P 1 = f is pr ior ity 1 power ; P 2 = P - f pr ior ity 2 power;
H 1 = H pr ior ity 1 hour s; H 2 = H - H pr ior ity 2 hour s.
We will assume that the capacities (M, M , P , f , H, H) and probabilities (p M. p P. pH) are 
common knowledge to participants. Furthermore it is assumed that long lead times are needed to 
expand (or contract capacity) and resource costs are fixed in the shon-run. 
Time in the experiments was measured in launches so that a per iod consisted of the 
activities performed between launches. Where necessary the index t = 1 ,  2, · · · represent periods 
in which resources are consumed, a launch takes place, and payload operations using station 
resources are performed. 
Payload Decision Variables 
An agent (payload designer) in this environment will be confronted with decisions
concerning payload de sign, le vel of o pe ratio ns (resource use), and timing (period of consumption). 
The notation is developed from the point of view of some fixed decision maker so the indexes of 
different decision makers can be dropped.
A payload must first be designed and developed which takes both time (0 = development
time- which can be either 1 or2 periods in the environment ) and capital (C = dollar amount).
The payload payoff (in dollars) depends on both the level of resource used and the design selected.
For the experiment we used quadratic payoff functions given by:
(1)
where a is the design variable intended to capture the notion of automation, and p ,  h are the levels
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of power and hours used by the payload. The a 's andy 's are parameters that are determined by 
the general characteristics of the payload (i.e., the type of agent). The mass of a payload is given 
by 
where m 0  is initial mass, m 1 is de sig n  mass, and m a  is a fixed coefficient of automation mass (in
the experiment m 0 +m a  a was called pr imary payload mass). These are all constants that 
characterize a design. The variables m d  and d will be discussed below. 
The de sig n co st was given by: 
(2)
C =CO+ Ca a - ["f.3m 1 - 'Y4'72 f) + Cdd (3)
where c 0 is initial co st s  and c a  the fixed coefficient of automation cost The parameters are 
generally chosen such that over the domain of feasible choices, design costs, and mass are inversely
related. The variables c d  and d will be discussed below. 
In addition to automation, a payload could be designed to be more rel iable . To introduce 
this notion we will assume that a payload has a probability of an operating mishap that is given by 
cr. If a payload mishaps, it will have a payoff function given by: 
Yo· B(p, h ;  a)=B(p, h;  a)
where Yoe (0,1]. A mishap simply scales back the benefits by a constant 'Yo·
(4) 
A mishap can be avoided at a cost. A payload designer in our experiment will be able to
counteract a mishap in two ways. First, he/she can design using his/her own input (d) to reduce the
probability of a mishap in the following manner:
cr = (1 + d)" (5)
where n e (-oo, 0).
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However, d will affect equations (2) and (3) by the factors mdd and cdd, respectively . 
Second, the agent can use station resources to backup his/her payload to prevent mishaps 
by using additional mass (m b) or hours (hb) such that 
_ { 1 if mb = m *  o r  if hb = hb * 
O - Yo othe rwise (
6)
In other words, mishaps can be avoided by adding backup which comes in either a lump-sum mass 
or in lump-sum manhours. Thus, the expected value of choosing a design (a, d, m b. hb) is given 
by: 
Next, we introduce the condition of an o pe rating l ife of a payload. Specifically, a payload 
will either have a one- or two-period operating life after which it produces no benefits (payoff). 
Notice that this implies that a payload with a two-period operating life requires no launch mass in 
its second period of operatioIL 2 
To close this system, we imposed "inventory" costs on subjects for the projects they developed 
and operated through ground cost per period prior to the launch of their payload and in-flight 
ground cost for each period their payload is on the station. 3 
It is clear from this discussion that our experimental environment is very complex and 
detailed. As mentioned in the introduction, this complexity was introduced to see how well a 
policy could resolve uncertainties. In addition, the existence of this complexity was utilized to 
make those responsible for implementing actual policies to develop better insights about how 
complexity is handled by the policies. This complexity was not without its costs. First, subjects 
must be made familiar with all these aspects of the environment. This means that payoffs had to be 
large so that subjects are sufficiently motivated in their decision making. In addition, ample time
2. As an additional constramt subjects were allowed to operate only one project per period. 
3. These costs are fiud costs in our model given by: C 1 9 + CI o where C 1 are ground costs per period. CI are in­
fiight costs and o is the operating length.
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for experience would be needed. Second, pinpoint predictions of theoretical models become 
difficult as the complexity increases. These aspects of our experiments are discussed later in this 
paper. 
Timing 
The process followed the calendar of events contained in Figure 1 .  Each of these events 
involved a decision by some agent or by the experimenter. The nature of these decisions will be 
outlined in the sections that follow. Now only a brief outline will be given. 
The experiment begins with an announcement by the experimenter about the amount of 
resources that would be available to agents who would be on the next launch. After this 
announcement, project managers would submit an application for a launch. Applications were 
processed and successful applications (a manifest) were announced. Project managers would begin 
projects. Final assessments of the launch capacity were made by the experimenters and any excess
capacity was announced. Project managers learned about progress on their projects (a decision by 
nature) and decided whether or not to spend resources in order to accelerate completion of their 
projects. Additional resources were allocated after reapplication and launch took place. 
Once projects are launched to the station the operating level of the station was assessed (a 
move by nature). Project managers also learned about the ability of their projects to operate in 
space (another nature choice). If the station was operating at less than capacity, decisions were 
made concerning which projects would receive fewer station resources. After this the projects 
operated and the cycle began for the next launch.
System Optimum 
To find the optimal allocation of resources (mass 1(m1), mass 2 (m2), power 1 (p2), power
2 (p 2), hour 1 (h 1), hour 2 (h 2)) and payload designs (a,d, and backup) one must solve for expected
system profits. The formal problem is: 
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Appendix A supplies the set of parameters chosen for our environment Table 1 supplies
the optimal allocation of resources in our environment and associated environment variables. 
There are four aspects of this table which will be important for the measurements we will make
later. 
1. At the optimum, subject 7 should not consume any station resources. He/she should
operate a "ground project"
2. At the optimum, projects should not use backup. The use of station resources to 
backup projects is a socially inefjicienJ f onn of insurance.
3. The level and mix of resources varies significantly across subjects. This refiects the
fact that there will be a variety of station users.
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TABLE 1 
OPTIMAL PAYLOAD CONFIGURATION 
RESOURCE USE 
SUBJECT DESIGN MASS POWER 
1 2 1 2 
• 
1 B 9 4 2 2 
2 D 12  3 3 5 
3 A 15  1 1 2 
• 
4 c 15  5 4 1 
5 E 8 3 1 2 
6 A 15  1 2 3 
7 B 0 0 0 0 
TOTALS 74 1 7  13 15  
• 
Two-period operating projects 
Number of payload designs per subject: 
5 x (3 back-up choices) = 1 5  possible designs 
Probabilities of resource supply: 
Capacities of Resources: 
PM = .33 PP = . 50 PH = .33
Even Periods Odd Periods 
M =91 
p =28
H =30 
M=14 
e = 13 
H = 16 
12 
M=58 
p =28
H=30 
N=50 
e = 13 
H = 16 
MANHOURS 
1 2 
2 2 
1 2 
3 5 
2 2 
4 1 
4 2 
0 0 
1 6  14 
4. The level of mass resources varies by period since a two-period operating project 
requires no mass in the "off' periods. Thus, an optimum requires payloads to
synchronize launch time.
POLICIES 
The policies developed in this section are based on descriptions of policies being proposed 
to NASA to price the resources of the station. These policies were developed from the "Operations 
Task Force Summary Report [OTF]" (1987) and Ban.ks, et al (1989). Thus, the policies we 
consider are based on a preliminary proposal to NASA. 
Policy 1. Cost-based Administered Process (CBAP)
This policy is intended to represent the space shuttle pricing and allocation policy prior to 
the Challenger disaster. In addition, it is also a description of accounting or cost-based policies; 
i.e., a simple posted price to be paid for specific resources (e.g., weight, volume) which is
calculated on a cost measure (e.g., marginal cost, fully allocated cost, etc.). Since this type of 
policy does not fully specify how one obtains an allocation, some additions must be made to the 
process to determine who gets what (e.g., first come first served, committee review). 
For purposes of the experiment subjects were designated as priority one, two, or three.4 
This designation of priority according to subjects as opposed to resources reflects the NASA 
policy of assigning priority to users. At the beginning of a period individuals could make an 
appl ic ation for resources (mass, power, and manhours) for the next two periods. Applications were 
filled on a first-come, first-served (random) method based on priority (priority one subjects 
allocated first, and so on). Figure 2 supplies the general application form used for each policy
which reflects the fact that individuals are given priority. In addition, if resources became
constrained, they were to be filled on the basis of individual priority.
4. Subjects 3 and 6 were assigned as priority one; subjects 2. 4, and 7 were assigned as priority two; and subjects 1 and 5 
were assigned as priority three. 
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FIGURE 2 
APPLICATION 
Application Number 
Project State Number ____ _ 
Launch Preference (Ordered Dates) 
Number of Periods on Station -----
Mass : Priority 1 
Priority 2 
Backup: Priority 1 
Priority 2 
Total: Priority 1 
Priority 2 
Participant ----­
Priority -----
First Preference ____ _ 
Second Preference ____ _ 
Consecutive Periods on Station 
Power : 
Operations 
Manhours: 
Operations 
Backup 
Total: 
Priority 1 
Priority 2 
Priority 1 
Priority 2 
Priority 1 
Priority 2 
Priority 1 
Priority 2 
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1st 2nd 3rd 
During a period after the final launch capacity was announced, individuals could reapply 
for any unused capacity. The only constraint was that subjects had to have the mass available to 
launch their project or it was taken off the manifest. Finally, there were prices charged for each 
resource to be paid at the time of manifest. The prices chosen were significantly below the 
competitive equilibrium prices so that in principle "excess demand" would occur. The prices were 
posted as follows: 
Mass=$0.25 
Power= $ 1.50 
Hour=$1.25 
In the shuttle environment it is believed that this fonn of scheduling has contributed to biasing 
lower-priority payloads towards smaller, easy-to-integrate packages (these are known as get-away­
special.s [gas cans]) in order to minimize the opponunity cost of delay. 
Policy 2. Barter.
This policy is an attempt to capture a process in which resources are divided among
identified participants who can use them or trade them for other station resources. This proposal 
(see OTF Report) assumes that an administrator or administrative committees allocate initial 
endowment of station resources to users who can barter among themselves. 
In the experiment we initially gave participants three envelopes of resources (mass 1, mass
2, power 1, power 2, hour l, and hour 2) corresponding to the first three periods of operations.
Individuals were allowed to barter with any other participants and resource transactions were 
conducted using slips of paper indicating a unit of a specific resource, priority, and time period.
Trades could be made across time, priority, and resources. There were no formal trading rules or 
market makers. However, since there were only seven station users and all were assembled in the
room, the bargaining sessions were frequently in the fonn of larger sets of people and group 
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discussion. At the beginning of a new period an additional envelope was given to subjects 
corresponding to two periods in advance. Thus, subjects always had three periods of resources in 
which to make their utilization plans. 
Policy 3. Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM).
This mechanism was an extension of the proposal found in Banks, et al (1989). This 
mechanism is a generalization of the English (or ascending-bid) auction. The mechanism is based 
on the principle that the "item goes to the current highest bidder who pays his bid," with an 
improvement rule in the bids. 
An order in AUSM consists of a vector of resources z;, a priority class p £ P ,  a time period
t e T, and a dollar bid b;, that is the triple (z;. p , t, b; ). If Zf, is the capacity of resources of priority
p , a time t, then the standing allocation of resources is given by the solution to
max l: b; 
i EC 
such that 
"t" zt SZ1 4.J Ip p 
iEC 
where C denotes the set of all combinations of orders submitted. The solution to the above gives
an allocation which can be changed only if another order
a) fits within the available capacity, or
b) displaces existing orders with lower bids.
Because of the lumpy nature of demands and the importance of packing resources, there may be
changes in allocations involving several traders simultaneo usly which can make all better off. In
particular, if a large package and bid is pan of  the current potential allocation, it may be costly for
one "small" user to displace it Several "small" users may be required to displace the bid. In order 
to avoid these possible allocations, we allowed subjects to coordinate their bids through public off-
board bids in which subjects could post a "proposed order" (z;, p, t, b;) which could be combined
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with other individuals. This off-board bidding was intended to signal coalitional bids to other 
agents. 
In the experiment, AUSM was conducted as a computerized bulletin board in which orders 
and standby orders were submitted by subjects and the provisional allocation updated as a new bid 
arrived. The order and bid was binding5
and, in the case of priority two resources, agents paid their bid whether or not they eventually 
received the resources. They paid for the right to the resources if the resources existed at the time 
they were to be used. 
Policy 4. Multiple Unit Double Auction (MUDA).
This policy proceeded exactly like the barter policy (envelopes, priority, three time periods, 
etc.); however, the trading was organized differently. In particular, subjects could buy and se ll 
resources for cash on an organized exchange with a bid-ask spread improvement rule using the 
multiple unit double auction in each market that was open (Plott and Gray, forthcoming in JEBO).
A total of eighteen markets were open at any one time. There were three types of resources, two 
priority classes, and three time periods. Thus, both spot and futures markets were available to 
subjects to coordinate actions. 
MODELS 
Several models are available to help organize and interpret the data. The complexity of the
environment prevents a complete specification of any of them. Fortunately all of the models yield 
similar diagnoses about the consequences of various policies. Had the models given contradictory
predictions, an experimental design that permitted a more complete specification would have been 
necessary. 
'Three models can be applied. A fourth, the most efficient allocation, is not a model. It is a 
measuring device that indicates the limits that exist under any particular policy. All four are listed
5. However, standby bids could be removed from the queue by the subjecl
1 7  
in Table 2 together with the known prorninant features of each. 
The core has not been calculated. A complete calculation would rest upon unsupported 
assumptions about attitudes toward risk. Under MUDA and AUSM an external medium of 
exchange exists so the most interesting allocation in the core is the most efficient allocation if 
indeed there is anything else in the core. Under Baner and CBAP the situation is much different. 
The parameters were not chosen so that double coincidents of wants existed throughout the agents. 
That is, the gains from exchange sometimes could not be attained through mutually beneficial two-
party trades. It was necessary for either source to take a risk or for three or more people to be part 
of a trade. Under Barter major improvements in efficiency over the status quo would appear to be 
difficult. Under CBAP the "treat point" is different than under Barter. Priority one agents are 
greatly advantaged and according to the model this advantage has consequence for all other agents. 
The competitive equilibrium has been calculated. It is a natural prediction to make when
markets are open as is the case with MUDA. The model would seem to be inapplicable in the other
policies. The parameters were constructed such that the equilibrium exists for risk neutral agents. 
Since futures markets are involved, the only equilibrium explored is the stationary equilibrium. 
Table 1 gives the equilibrium resource holdings for each agent. Figure 3 contains a graph of the 
demand and supply for manhours, and associated competitive equilibrium prices for priority 1 and 
2 resources. 6 
6. To detern1.ine these prices notice that if B(x) is the benefit/payoff for x then the market clearing prices are determined by 
finding: 
max p B (x 1) + (1 -p) + B (xi + x :i) -p ix 1 - p 2x 2
where p is probability of consllained supply and X I is a vector of priority one resources and X 2 is a vector of priority two 
resources and where 
or 
and 
P1 =pB'(x1)+(1-p)B'(x1 +xi)
P2=(1-p)B'(x1 +xi)
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TABLE2 
PREDICTIONS OF POLICY OUTCOMES BY V ARJOUS MODELS 
Outside Money No Exchange Medium 
MUDA AUSM BARTER CBAP 
Most Efficient 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Allocation Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency 
CORE (i) contains (i) contains (i) efficiency (i) priority one 
most efficient most efficient improvement agent choose 
allocation allocation over initial persona 
endowment maximums 
(ii) ground (ii) priority one 
project gets on agents use 
Station resources for 
backup 
(iii) Large (iii) low 
projects do not priority agents 
get "additional scale-back (low 
resources" eff.) 
Competitve (i) prices (i) indirect (i) no direct (i) no market 
equilibrium observable prices are prices per activity is 
price and observable resource is observable 
allocates observable 
(ii) allocation 
is the most 
efficient 
N oncooperative No complete Many exist. Nash 
game game theoretic The most equilibrium 
model exist efficient implies that 
allocation is a Priority 1
Nash agents take all 
equilibrium. they want. 
The strong Others scale 
Nash is back. 
implementable Coordination 
with off-board problems exist. 
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For the most part the situation is too complicated for any simple application of game 
theoretic models. The table contains some properties. 
EXPERIMENT AL DESIGN
The elements of experimental design are in Table 3. Subjects recruited for the experiments 
were undergraduates at the California Institute of Technology. The subjects were told that they 
were going to participate in an experiment that would require their involvement over five days with 
sessions lasting approximately four hours each day. An introductory one-hour session was given to 
the subjects during which instructions were read giving a description of the environment and 
individual payoffs. Subjects were allowed to take home their payoff sheets for a day and could call
the experimenter for any clarification of their payoff sheets.7
Although only seven subjects were used in the experiment we recruited and trained eight 
subjects so that one individual could be used as a reserve if a participant could not make it for 
emergency-type reasons. (Participants were told that if they did not show up for any day of the 
experiment, they would forfeit their accumulated earnings.) The reserve subject assisted in 
recording data from the experiment and was paid the average earnings in the experiment. The 
backup student was never used. 
In our third experiment, we used engineers, managers, and consultants from NASA
Headquarters (Washington, D.C.). These individuals have the responsibility of developing and 
implementing station resource allocation policies. 'This experiment was complicated by two 
important facts concerning these subjects. First. we were not allowed to pay these individuals for
their participation in the experiment due to legal concerns of "double pay." Second, these 
individuals would be available for o nl y  one (8· 10 hour) day. In order to loosen these constraints
and maintain the saliency in individual decision making we supplied each NASA participant with a 
Xi =,I 7. Individuals did take advantage of this "study time" to call in !heir questions and develop their own individual aids to 
make design decisions. 
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Experiment Date 
1 June 12, 1988 
2 September 4, 1988 
3 February 17, 1988 
TABLE 3* 
Subject Pool 
Caltech 
Caltech 
NASA 
Order in which 
Policies were Conducted 
AUSM, Market, Baner, CBAP 
Market, Baner, AUSM, CBAP 
Market, CBAP, AUSM 
• The instructions and payoffs used in this experiment can be found in Appendix C.
2 2  
technical advisor (a Caltech undergraduate). The technical advisor was familiar with the timing,
application process, and potential payload payoffs. All decisions had to be made by the NASA
subject The payoff from the decisions made by the NASA subject during the experiment was to be 
paid to the Caltech undergraduate technical advisor assigned to the NASA subject The cover letter 
sent to each participant inviting him/her to the experiment can be found in Appendix B. 
Payoffs from the experiment were established at a high level so as to properly motivate the 
participants to understand the complex environment they faced (the average payoff for the four-day 
sessions was $345 or approximately $21.50 an hour). 
We conducted three separate experiments in this environment with the subjects 
participating without changing their payoff opponunities during experiments. Table 3 provides an 
overview of the experimental design for the experiments we conducted. 
RESULTS: POLICY EVALUATION 
The results are discussed in four subsections. The first reports the overall efficiency of the
policies. The second contains an analysis of the efficiency results in which the sources of 
inefficiency are explored and the degree to which the relative performance can be understood in
terms of traditional economic models is discussed. The third section discusses signals for growth 
of the station resources (M.P, and H). Each policy generates data that are observable to policy
makers. If decisions to expand various dimensions are administrative in nature, certain signals are 
natural ones to explore for purposes of policy decisions. The section explores the degree to which
the signals are correct. The fourth section discusses the accuracy of models that might be applied
to capture the prominent features of the processes. 
Efficiency 
All of the parameters are known to the experimenter. Consequently it is possible to
detennine the allocation of resources that will maximize the total expected profit of station users.
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Since station resources are fixed in supply, all sources of inefficiency exist on the users' side. In 
models that are continuous approximations of the process, maximized expected profit implies ex 
ante Pareto optimality in the absence of risk aversion. 
The measure of efficiency we use implicitly assumes that the benefits to all users are 
equally weighted and that total benefit is a linear function of individual benefit. In the absence of
specific interpretations or goals, this measure of efficiency seems to provide a good indication of 
how gains from exchange might have been exhausted by the process. It is important to notice 
however that the measure does assume that the "social" utility of projects has been scaled to be a 
dollar metric . 
. Result 1. The policies ordered from highest to lowest efficiency are market. AUSM, barter,
CBAP. 
The per period average efficiency for each of the policies are shown in Figure 4. The "no 
trade" condition measures the efficiency of the initial endowment allocation used in the barter 
policy and the market policy. It is reported as one baseline for the effectiveness of barter and 
markets. As can be seen CBAP has the lowest efficiency (about 60 percent) and the market has the
highest (about 87 percent). Barter and AUSM are similar but an average of the two series yields 
has a higher efficiency for AUSM (80. 1 percent) as opposed to barter (76. 1 percent). 
Result 2. The market and Barter policies experience an increased efficiency with repetition.
CBAP and AUSM remain virtually unchanged with repetition. 
'The time series of the average efficiency in each period is shown in Figure 5. If we
compare the mean efficiency of periods less than three with periods more than three, we obtain the
following statistics: 
Periods CBAP 
59.4 
58.0 
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Baner
73.7 
77.3
AUSM 
8 1.7 
78.3 
Market 
83
89.3
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Observation 1. A cyclical pattern is apparent in the efficiency time series. However, this cycle is 
not unifonn across experiments.
Analysis of Efficiency Performance 
Inefficiencies can come from a variety of different sources. (Five sources are analyzed in 
this section.) 
Station Resources Wasted. Wasted station resources consist of resources that are 
unallocated and resources that are allocated but not used. First, resources might be unallocated to 
users and just remain on the station with no one attempting to use them. Or, resources might be
allocated to participants but remain unused in the sense that they are held by the agent even though
the marginal returns are zero to the agent that holds them. Because all resources are allocated to
participants in barter and market policies, only the second type of waste can occur. In CBAP and
A USM agents apply for resources. Applications for resources can fall short of the amount of 
resources that exist, so in these two policies both types of waste can occur. 
Result 3. Wasted power and manpower contribute most to the inefficiency of the CBAP policy.
As can be seen in Figure 6 the waste of power and manpower is consistently larger in
CBAP than for any other policy. In power, for example, the waste under CBAP was approximately
25 percent of rated station capacity. On the other hand the waste of power and manpower under the
market policy was on average less than 2 percent of rated capacity. The waste of mass was low
under all policies ranging from 3 percent to 8 percent of rated capacity. In this range the waste
from barter was consistently higher than A USM and markets. These data tell us that the mass
constraint. the ability to transpon projects to the station, was binding but the projects that got on the
station were such that the other resources were in excess supply. Specifically, mass was a major 
component in a project's design and came in discrete amounts. Thus. Barter and CBAP both had 
problems in coordinating payload mass requirements. 
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Exclusion from Station. Each agent had a special project that could be interpreted as a 
ground project even though it was not labeled that way and subjects were not given that 
interpretation. The project required zero units of station mass launch capabilities (because the 
project stayed on the ground). The project could (technically) use other station resources (such as 
manpower or power) in performing special functions with station equipment or for relaying data to 
the ground, but for the most part choice of this special project meant that the project was on the 
ground. 
Efficient allocation of station resources required that one particular agent should always 
choose the ground project. In an economic sense the agent was extramarginal and should be
excluded from use of station resources. All other agents should be included in the sense that they
should have projects on the station (i.e. , choose projects other than the ground project) . 
Result 4. The separation of excluded and included agents is most effective in the market and
A USM policies and least effective in CBAP and barter.
Figure 7 shows the frequency of choice of the zero project by the extramarginal person and 
by other participants. 
Project Design. For each agent the set of all projects can be described in terms of a set of 
design parameters. This leads to two different ways of  describing the opportunity set of individual
projects. The possible choices could be described as a set of different projects or the set could be 
described as only one project with several different design characteristics. We have tended to use
the latter in this section.
Tile parameters are backup (yes or no), level of automation (a), and level of reliability (d) .
A project could be backed up with either mass such as spare parts or a duplicate subsystem. A
project could also be backed up with manhours such as an astronaut who is trained to fix the project
should it have a mishap. Backup guarantees that once a project is on the station it will operate at
the most productive rate, assuming that station resources are available. Backed-up projects cannot
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experience individual failures .  However, given the risk and given the opponunity cost of station 
resources the insurance provided by backup is too expensive. Backup should never occur. In the 
efficient allocation of resources no project should be backed up.
Figure 8 shows the average of each type of backup used expressed as a percentage of the 
total amount of that resource that is available. Figure 9 shows the average value of resources used 
as backup in tenns of the competitive equilibrium prices.8
Result 5.  Under CBAP, project designs tend to use backup more than under other policies.
The result is clear from the figures. More backup resources are used under CBAP and they 
tend to be the most v aluable (priority one) resources. When backup occurs in the policies, other 
than CBAP, it is with the less valuable priority two resources. 
Automation is a second parameter which fixes the project design. Automation is closely 
related to mass. Designs that are more automated have a higher marginal productivity of labor and 
also require more mass. Thus, if mass is inexpensive relative to labor, one would think that 
automation might occur to a higher degree. As mass becomes more expensive relative to labor, one 
would expect the designs to be characterized by less automation. Just the reverse would be true for 
the price of manhours and automation. In CBAP, for example, in which mass is priced low relative 
to the competitive equilibrium (0.25 as opposed to a competitive equilibrium price of 1 .50), one 
might expect projects to be more automated.
As it turns out, features of the policies other than price have a substantial impact on 
automation. In particular, the way that resources are allocated in the manifest and the way
resources are rationed in case there is a station failure have a big impact on design choice. CBAP 
has agents classified by priority, and does not designate resources by priority. This property affects
the designs. High priority agents whose requests are filled first will automate more under CBAP
than the other processes. Low priority agents, whose requests are filled after the requests of others,
8. This measure of the value of backup will tend to overstate the loss due to backup since it does not subtract out the
opportunity cost of the use of the resource to an individual. 
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autom ate less under CB AP in hope that some (small) amounts of mass will be left over for them to 
use. 
Result 6. People designated as priority one people under CBAP automate more under CB AP than 
other processes. People designated as low priority agents under CBAP automate less under CB AP 
than in other processes. 
Figure 10 contains data for priority one agents. Under CBAP these agents place over 45
pe rcent of the projects in the highest two categories of automation. Under the other three policies
these same people choose less than 20 percent of the projects from these two categories on average. 
Under CBAP the first priority agents never launched a project at the other end of the scale with the
lowest level automation. Yet, under the other three policies these people choose an average of 1 0
percent of the projects at the lowest level of automation. 
The radical shift of designs in response to the policy can also be seen in the behavior of the
low priority agents as reported in Figure 1 1 . Under CBAP low priority agents automate less, with
almost all projects at the lowest two automation levels. Under the other three policies they
automated significantly more. Thus, the behavior of the two groups is exactly the opposite. 
C. Growth Signals 
Each process provides different signals for growth. Two processes provide a source of 
revenue to support growth. The other processes only provide data and signals for an administrative 
decision about growth. Presumably the signals are related to a marginal cost and marginal benefit 
comparison. Since marginal costs l)ave not been speci fied in the environment, the focus is on 
marginal benefits alone.
Four measures seem to be relevant to growth decisions: 1) the revenues generated by the 
sale of resources; 2) the marlc.et prices or implicit  prices9 in the case of AUSM; 3) resources wasted;
9. The implicit prices are those which form a least square fit in a model that uses bids as the dependent variable.
Specifically, we estimated the model: 
bidi = <XQ + P t mas s l i + P2 mas s 2i +
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and 4) resources requested. The first measure is relevant for AUSM and CBAP. The second 
measure is relevant to market and AUSM. All policies generate the third measure. The logic of the
third measure is that the most valued resources will be wasted the least and therefore resources that 
are wasted the least should receive first priority in growth. The last measure is the amount of
resources requested by those attempting to acquire resources .  CBAP is the only policy for which 
this measure might be sensible. 
In evaluating growth the question of increased station rated capacity must be separated 
from the question of reliability. For purposes of discussion, growth of a resource will mean only an 
increase in rated capacity and not an increase in the amount of priority one resources. It is as 
though a fixed number of resources will survive a station breakdown and not a proportion of 
capacity. Thus,  growth will mean only an increase in priority two resources with priority one 
resources fixed. Increased reliability will mean an increase in priority one resources with rated 
capacity (priority one plus priority two) fixed. 
The station revenue results are surprising only because AUSM failed to generate revenues
equal to competitive equilibrium values. The fact the CBAP revenues are so small reflects the fact 
that the prices are not designed to be demand determined and therefore market clearing. 
Specifically, the result is: 
Result 7. Revenue generated by AUSM is 550 percent greater than revenue CBAP. In terms of
the level of revenue generated at the competitive equilibrium price we find on average revenue 
generated by AUSM is 90 percent of what would be theoretically generated if competitive
equilibrium prices were charged.
'The average per period revenue in Figures 12  and 1 3  make the point. As can be seen, each
12 Power l i + Y2 Power 2i +
'1'1 manhours l i + '1'2 manhours 2i + 
so that the estimates (�i .  �. Yl , Yi. 'f 1;  and 'f2 are implicit resource prices).
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period the revenues from AUSM lie between the revenues predicted by a competitive equilibrium 
model and the revenues generated by CBAP. 
The next result is focused on the growth priorities that should be given different resources. 
Without cost considerations, which resources should be treated as the most important in terms of 
growth? Theoretically the order should be hours first, then power, and mass is last. 
Result 8. All indices in market. AUSM, and barter give the correct ordering of growth priority.
The signals are for highest priority manhours to be increased, followed by power and then mass. 
The two indices available in CBAP give an incorrect ordering. Mass, which should be given the
lowest priority, is incorrectly given top priority. 
In order to check the results, study Table 4. The correct ordering is given by the marginal 
values of resources at the optimum allocation (the competitive equilibrium). Each index is 
provided for each policy. The higher price of a resource is interpreted as a higher marginal value 
and thus higher priority (recall that only priority two is relevant for capacity expansion). A check 
on prices in market and AUSM reveals that the values of prices are as required for the result A 
similar check on the values of wasted resources in all four policies gives the result. Recall that a 
higher value of waste implies a lower priority for growth. CBAP has one index (requested
resources) not available to the other two. If greater requests of resources imply greater priority for 
growth, then this index does not generate the true priorities. 
Growth priorities do not carry all of the information necessary for a growth decision. The 
value of expansion must be compared to cost The actual magnitudes of benefits must be compared 
to the true benefits. 
Result 9. In market policy the values of growth tend to be overstated and in AUSM the values
tend to be understated 
The only exceptions to the result are power 2 and mass 2 in AUSM which have revealed
marginal values of .27 and 4.41. The true values at the optimum are mass 2 = .15 and power 2 = 
3 4  
TABLE 4 
GROWTH POTENTIAL MEASURES :  PER PERIOD AVERAGES FOR ALL RESOURCES
M 1 M z P 1 P 2 H 1 H 2 
Theory Station revenues 260 
Resource prices 1.50 .25 3.55 1.15 4 .67 1 .60
Market Station revenue 1
Resource prices (average) 1 . 8 1 .50 4.95 1.60 6.55 2.25 
Resource waste 3 4.5 %  1.0% 0.5% 
Resource requested 1 
AUSM Station revenues 235 
Resource prices (implicit) .88 .27 4.4 1 .49 3.9 1  1.54 
Resource waste 3 3.0% 2.7% 1% 
Resource requested 98% 100% 100% 
B arter Station revenues 1
Resource prices 2
Resource waste 3 8% 3% 2% 
Resource requested 1
CB AP Station revenues 38 
Resource prices 2
Resource waste 3 8% 24% 10% 
Resource requested 1 34% 98% 116% 
1 Resources were distributed free of charge.
2 The system generated no prices. 
3 Resource waste does not include backup losses. 
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3.55.  
Only market and AUSM provide measures of the value of increased reliability. If overal
capacity is fixed, then increased reliability is equivalent to shifting one unit of a resource from 
priority two to priority one .  Thus the opportunity cost of a priority one resource is the value of the 
priority two resource foregone. And, the resulting value of the priority two resource is the 
difference at the margin between priority one resources and priority two. This difference gives the 
marginal value of taking some action that increases reliability while leaving rated resource capacity 
fixed. 
Result 10. At the social optimum the marginal value of increased liability for manhours, power,
and mass are 2.90, 2.40, and 1.35,  respectively. The comparable magnitudes under market are 4. 30, 
3 .35 ,  1 .3 1 ,  respectively, and under AUSM are 2.37 ,  3.92, .6 1 ,  respectively. 
When comparing overall the priorities given by the market, policies differ from the social
optimum in the order of priority between increased power and increased reliability of mass. Under 
A USM the only difference in order is between increased reliability of manpower and power. Aside 
from these two differences market and AUSM generate the same priorities for action. However, the 
overall magnitudes are higher than optimal in market and lower than optimal in AUSM.
RESULTS; MODEL EVALUATION 
This section attempts to focus on two of the broad questions posed in the introduction. Do 
we understand what happened? What might be done to improve the policies? 
Markets 
Figures 14- 19 contain the time series of the mean transaction prices and volume made in 
the markets for each experiment (labeled series l .  2 .  or 3 in the figures). Recall that eighteen
markets were open simultaneously (three resources times two priorities times three periods). The
figures show that all eighteen resource markets contain some irregularities relative to the 
convergence patterns usually observed in less complicated markets. Priority one mass in series 2 
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converges to prices below the competitive equilibrium. Priority two mass in series one hardly 
trades at all. In both series priority one power is priced above expectations while priority two 
power does not trade. Manhours trade at their prices higher than expected in both series. 
Currently we have no explanation for these deviations from expectations. On one hand, 
given the complicated setting, we have no baseline for what to expect. Certainly prices are within 
an order of magnitude of predictions. Bubbles or wide speculation and swings do not appear to 
occur. We have found no biases resulting from the fact that the price predictions result from an 
expected value calculation. 
Of considerable interest is the behavior of the futures markets. The exceptional markets are 
Series 1 power and Series 1 manpower in which the futures markets were used only once in a total 
volume of 129 units traded. By contrast the volume in all other markets was completely dominated 
by futures trading. Neglecting period 1 resources, which cannot be traded as futures, the proportion 
of trades in priority 1 markets that are futures contracts are: 67% mass l , 49% power 1, 56% 
manhours 1 .  
The pattern suggests that future markets a re  not good predictors o f  spot prices. The volume 
of future trades is for delivery as opposed to speculative resale. The bulk of transactions are made 
far in advance. Spot markets are then reserved for "clean up" trades due to miscalculations or due 
to mistakes that need last minute corrections and the prices can deviate sharply from the historical 
patterns. 
Less trading than expected occurred in the priority two markets. Why this occurred is an 
open question. Nevertheless, the priority instrument as a contingent market seemed to work 
smoothly. The prices, given the prices of priority one sources and risk aversion, seem "reasonable . "  
AUSM 
The allocation with 100 percent efficiency can be supported as a Nash equilibrium. This 
allocation never occurred in either series. As was discussed in an earlier section, the e:dstence of 
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other Nash equilibria is suspected. The stable level of efficiency in the experiments suggests that i t  
may be too hard to coordinate demands to get to  100% efficiency with the current AUSM
technology. 
Barter 
Since experiments with barter have never before been conducted, the global observations 
should be made. Trade actually occurs. Search for trading partners does not continue for the whole 
pe riod. The negotiations version of a "strike" or no trade default positions do not occur. 
Traders are position improving in the sense that all participants are made better off by 
virtue of trading. Of the 1 1 3 cases of individual initial endowments, 97 are better off at the end of 
that period or are more than twice as well off at the end of the next period. The basic gains from 
trade propositions can be observed in operation. 
For the most part barter was smoother than expected. Efficiency levels rivaled AUSM in 
experiment 1 .  This leads to questions about the robusmess of the result in different environments. 
The number of potential traders might be imponant The existence of a need for "chains" of traders 
might also be important. In the current environment each trader has some of every resource so 
direct trades were always a possibility. If a need for a third or fourth party was necessary for a 
transaction, the process might not be so efficient. 
The efficiency of the process also raises another question. Could it be improved upon? 
Perhaps some sort of organized exchange or internal medium of exchange (as opposed to U.S. 
currency) might improve the process.
CBAP 
The CBAP policy demonstrates a fundamental problem with marginal cost pricing or
indeed any cost based pricing policy. If lags in supply occur and if excess demand exists while the 
process is determining a supply response, rationing problems exist The solutions to the rationing 
problems affect not only the allocation of resources and the value to which space resources are put, 
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they also affect the signals for future growth and expanded supply. Demand-based pricing systems 
are far superior. 
The panicular method of dealing with the rationing problem that has evolved into the space 
shuttle pricing policies adds to the problems caused by cost-based pricing. Priority is given to a 
source of demand or type of agent Priority is not treated as a type of resource. As a result the
method of allocating the scarce re sources and resolving the uncertainties has a feedback on the 
projects that are selected and the project designs. 
Priority one agents choose to automate. Agents with lower priorities do not automate. The 
reason is because automation uses mass and low priority agents face a tradeoff between mass use 
and the probability of having a project on the manifest. The bigger the project the less chance of 
manifest Thus, low priority agents choose smaller designs. 
An interesting phenomenon called the "gas can" has been observed in shuttle. Low priority 
investigators have been avoiding large projects which seem to have large benefits and are proposing 
small projects instead. In a sense the projects are the size of gas cans and have the capacity to fit in 
the bay of shuttle along with larger projects placed on shuttle by higher priority agents. The 
phenomenon has been attributed to the shuttle pricing policy from which CBAP was fashioned. 
We have been able to produce a similar phenomenon in our experiments. Low priority 
agents choose low mass projects. High priority agents choose big projects. In our experiments the
phenomenon is definitely attributable to the priority system used in CBAP coupled with prices so 
low that demand needs to be rationed by other means. The means of rationing by priority of agents 
affects the projects chosen. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is important to remember that this study focused on only one point in a very large 
parameter space. It is hoped that the results from this first "test bed" will lead to discussions that
will result in judgements about which points should be considered next. How should the 
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environment be changed to help with a more infonned judgement about how alternative policies
would work? 
All of the policies explored here are complete relative to the testbed environment. All 
policies worked in the sense that decisions were made. Unanticipated behaviors caused no
problems. Administratively CBAP is the most difficult It is also the policy that is liked least by
participants (see Table 5).  Even the first priority agents who had the most to gain from the CBAP 
policy gave it low marks. 
None of these policies are complete relative to more complicated environments. The down 
manifest was ignored. Storage on station and the related capacity limitations were not considered. 
However, both of these problems seem sufficiently similar to problems found in the environment 
now that their inclusion will be only a complicating elaboration as opposed to changes that might 
challenge the basic principles which underline the policies. Two sources of externalities are likely 
to exist that are not elaborations on what has been studied here and might require special policies .
Some projects can be incompatible in the manifest. Other projects might be incompatible on the 
station. The processes examined here make no provision for dealing with such problems. Another 
potential source of policy incompleteness is the determination of the number and nature of priority 
classes of resources. Currently the policies reflect no principle for making that determination.
Do we understand the pattern of results generated by the policies? Clearly every detail of 
such a complicated situation cannot be fully understood but the data yield no major surprises. For 
anyone who has studied the behavior of experimental markets the behavior of eighteen 
simultaneous markets certainly presents inte re sting phenomena. The fact that prices were on the 
same order of magnitude as the prediction of the competitive model suggests the power of that
model as an explanation of the general patterns. ln all cases the patterns of resource flows are
understandable in terms of the models employed. 
Natural comparisons exist among the policies. Given ai:1 initial distribution of resources , a
4 6  
Market 
B arter 
AUSM 
CBAP 
TABLE S 
THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO RANKED THE PROCESS FIRST AMONG 
THE FO UR PROCESSES A CCORDING TO THE GIVEN QUESTION
6 7 10 
6 5 3 
1 0 1 
1* 3* 0 
Q 1 Which one would you choose to use? 
Q 2  Which one was most profitable? 
Q 3 Which one worked the best? 
Q 4 Which one was most fun? 
Q s Which one was most fair? 
4 
8 
2 
0 
* These were priority one people under CBAP.
4 7  
9 
5 
3 
0 
policy of market reallocation is superior  to a policy of barter. The use of a medium of exchange 
facilitates coordination. However, a policy of barter is much superior to a policy of no trading o r  a 
policy of not permitting any decentralized adjustment subsequent to the initial allocation. Resale o r
retrading of  resources should not be discouraged. In fact NASA should help organize such
exchanges. 
Both AUSM and CBAP involve an initial sale of resources. The AUSM process is  clearly 
superior in all dimensions .  Not only does CBAP not facilitate efficient resource allocation, it also 
gives the wrong signals for growth. If resources are to be sold initially , then AUSM should be 
seriously considered as a candidate for allocating the station's resources to commercial users. 
Fundamental to the operations of these policies is the method of dealing with supply 
uncertainty. A priority resource contract should be employed. Priority should be defined in terms 
of resources and not the particular user. Reliability of supply is itself 'a scarce resource that should 
be reflected in all decisions and policies.
4 8  
APPENDIX A
Experiment Parameters
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S ub j e c t l
A B* c D E
au t oma t ion ( a )  2 . 0 0 l . 0 0 l . 00 . s o 0 . 00 
d urab i l i ty ( d ) 1 0 . 00 1 0 . 00 3 0 . 00 1 0 . 00 0 . 00 
m i s ha p  revenue ( yo ) . 7 5  . 7 5  . 7 5 . 7 5 . 7 5  
n e ta ( n ) - . 5 7 - .  5 7 0 . 5 7 - . 5 7  - . 5 7 
a u t o ma t ion ma s s  ( ma ) 3 . 00 3 . 00 3 . 00 3 . 0 0 3 . 0 0 
d urab i l i t y  ma s s  ( md ) . l . l . l . 1 . l 
g amma 3 . 7 • 7 . 7 . 7 . 7 
a l p ha l 7 . 2 6 7 . 2 6 7 . 26 7 .  2 6  l . 00 
g amma l • 6 3 . 6 3 . 6 3  . 6 3  . 1 4  
a l p ha 2 1 7 . 0 5 1 7 . 0 5 1 7 . 0 5 1 7 . 0 5 1 7 . 0 5 
g amma 2 l . 8 8 l . 88 l . 8 8  1 . 8 8 l . 8 8 
gamma 4 . 2 2 . 2 2 . 2 2 . 2 2  . 00 
cm 4 . 2 7 4 . 2 7 4 . 2 7 4 . 2 7 . 20 
a u t oma t i on c o s t ( ca ) 1 9 . 4 7 1 9 . 4 7  1 9 . 4 7  1 9 . 4 7  1 9 . 4 7 
d urab i l i ty cos t ( c d ) . 2 2 . 2 2 . 2 2 . 2 2 . 2 2 
b a c kup manhours ( bh ) 2 . 00 2 . 00 2 . 00 2 . 00 2 . 00 
b a c kup mas s ( bm ) 2 2 . 00 2 2 . 00 2 2 . 00 2 2 . 00 2 2 . 00 
max powe r ( p ) 4 . 00 4 . 00 4 . 00 4 . 00 4 . 00 
m i n  powe r ( 2 )  0 . 00 0 . 00 0 . 00 o . oo 0 . 00 
max manhours (h ) 4 . 00 4 . 00 4 . 00 4 . 00 4 . 00 
m i n  manhours ( h )  0 . 00 0 . 00 0 . 00 o . oo 0 . 00 
ini t i a l  cos t  < co > 4 2 . 1 0  2 1 . 6 7  26 . 1 0 1 1 . 94 3 . 5 0 
g roup cos t ( c' ) 2 . 0 2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0 
s l i p cos t ( c s 8 . 0  8 . 0  8 . 0  8 . 0  8 . 0  
i n - f l i g h t  c o s t ( C f ) 2 . 5 2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5 max o pe ra t ing pe r iods ( o ) 2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0  
min deve lopmen t  t ime (9 ) l . O 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 L O  
p robab i l i ty o f  s l i p • 2 5  • 2 5  • 2 5  • 25 . 2 5  
p robab i l i ty o f  mi s ha p  (a ) . 2 5 • 2 5  . 1 4 • 25 l . O i n i t ia l  ma s s  ( mo ) o . o  o . o o . o 0 . 0  0 . 0 
p r i ma ry mass 7 . 0 4 . 0  6 . 0 3 . 0  0 . 0  
p i  foot  (! ) 2 2 . 0  2 2 . 0  2 2 . 0  2 2 . 0  2 2 . 0  
max mas s (iii ) 1 0 . 0  1 0 . 0  1 0 . 0  1 0 . 0  9 . 0  
min ma s s  ( !!! ) 0 . 0  o . o  0 . 0  o . o  0 . 0 
•Deno tes opt imal des ign
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S ub j e c t 2 * 
A B c D E 
au t oma t i on ( a )  1 .  0 0 . 0  4 . 0 2 . 0 2 .  0
d u rab i l i ty ( d ) 5 .  0 o . o  5 .  0 5 . 0  1 0 .  0 
m i s ha p  r e venue ( yo ) . 8 5 . 8 5 . 8 5 . 8 5 . 8 5 
ne ta ( n ) - . 6 2 - . 6 2 - . 6 2  - . 6 2  - . 6 2 
a u t oma t i o n  ma s s  ( ma ) 2 . 0  2 .  0 2 . 0  2 .  0 2 . 0 
d urab i l i t y ma s s  ( md ) . 2 . 2 • 2 . 2 . 2 
g anvna 3 . 5 . 5 . 5 . 5 . 5 
a l pha l 5 . 7 2 1 .  0 0  5 . 7 2 5 .  7 2 5 .  7 2
gamma l . 2 2 . 1 4  . 2 2 . 2 2 . 2 2  
a l p ha 2 8 . 0 9 8 . 0 9 8 . 0 9 8 . 0 9 8 . 0 9 
gamma 2 1 .  2 5 1 .  2 5  1 .  2 5  1 .  2 5 1 . 2 5 
ganvna 4 . 3 0 . o o . 3 0 . 3 0 . 3 0 
cm 6 . 3 3 . 2 0 6 . 3 3 6 .  3 3 6 . 3 3 
a u t oma t io n  c o s t C ea > 2 . 3 3 2 . 3 3 2 . 3 3 2 . 3 3 2 . 3 3 
du r ab i l i ty c o s t ( c d ) . 0 , • 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 
bac kup manhours ( bh )  2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0  2 .  0 
bac kup ma s s  ( bm )  6 . 0  6 . 0  6 . 0  6 . 0  6 . 0  
max powe r (p) 9 . 0  9 . 0  9 . 0  9 . 0  9 . 0  
min powe r ( E ) 2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0  
max manhours (h ) 4 . 0  4 . 0  4 . 0 4 . 0  4 . 0  
min manhours ( h ) 0 . 0  0 . 0  o . o  0 . 0  0 . 0  
i n i t ia l  c o s t ( c0 ) 5 . 3 8 2 . 6 0 1 2 . 3 7  7 . 6 6 7 .  7 6 
g roup c o s t ( c, ) 2 . 5 0 2 . 5 0  2 . 5 0 2 . 5 0 2 . 5 0 
s l i p c o s t C c s 5 . 0 0 5 . 0 0 5 . 0 0 5 . 0 0 5 . 0 0 
in-f l i g h t  c o s t ( c f ) 2 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 
max o pe ra t ing pe r i od s ( o )  1 .  0 0  1 .  0 0 1 .  0 0  1 .  0 0  1 .  0 0
m i n  de ve l o pmen t  t ime (0 ) 2 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 
p robab i l i ty o f  s l i p . 3 3 • 3 3 . 3 3 . 3 3 • 3 3 
p robab i l i ty o f  m i s ha p  ( a )
• 3 3 1 .  0 . 3 3 . 3 3  . 2 3
i n i t ia l  ma s s  ( m0 ) 0 . 0  o . o  o . o  0 . 0  0 . 0 0 
p r imary ma s s  3 . 0  o . o  9 . 0  5 . 0  6 . 0  
p i  f oo t  {.][ )  3 0 . 0 3 0 . 0  3 0 . 0  3 0 . 0 3 0 . 0  
max ma s s  (iii ) 1 1 .  0 9 . 0  1 1 . 0 1 1 .  0 1 1 .  0 
min ma s s  < !!! ) 0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  o . o  
*Deno t e s  o p t ima l  de s i gn
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S ub j e c t J * 
A B c u F. 
a u t oma t ion ( a ) 3 . 0  0 . 0  3 . 0  s .  0 3 . 0  
d u rab i l i ty ( d ) 8 . 0  0 . 0  8 0 . 0  8 . 0 2 4 . 0 
mi s ha p  r e ve n ue ( Yo ) . 7 5 . 7 5 . 7 s . 7 5 . 7 5 
ne t a  ( n )  - . 3 2 - . 3 2 - . 3 2 - . 3 2 - . 3 2 
a u t oma t i o n  ma s s  ( ma ) 3 . 0  3 . 0  3 . 0  3 . 0  3 .  0 
d urab i l i t y ma s s  ( md ) • 2 5 . 2 5 . 2 5 . 2 5 . 2 5 gamma J . 5 • 5 . 5 . 5 . 5 
a l pha l 5 .  8 2 1 .  0 0  5 . 8 2 5 . 8 2  5 . 8 2 
g amma l . 5 7 . 1 4  . 5 7 . 5 7 . 5 7 
a l pha 2 8 . 4 2 8 . 4 2  8 . 4 2  8 . 4 2  8 . 4 2 
gamma 2 . 4 5 . 4 5 . 4 5 . 4 5 . 4 5 
gaimia 4 . 9 1 . 0 0 . 9 , . 9 1 . 9 ,  
cm 9 . 5 0 . 2 0  9 . 5 0 9 . 5 0 9 . 5 0 
au t oma t i on c o s t ( c8 ) 5 .  3 1 5 .  3 1  5 .  3 1  5 . 3 1 5 . 3 1 
durab i l i t y c o s t ( c d ) . 0 4 . 0 4 . 0 4 . 0 4 . 0 4 
bac kup manho urs ( b h ) 5 . 0 0 5 . 0 0 5 . 0 0 5 . 0 0 5 . 0 0 
bac kup mas s ( bm ) 2 5 . 0 0 2 5 . 0 0 2 5 . 0 0 2 5 . 0 0 2 5 . 0 0 
max powe r (p ) 4 . 0 0  4 . 0 0 4 . 0 0 4 . 0 0 4 . 0 0 
m i n  powe r ( 2 )  0 . 0  o . o  o . o  o . o  0 . 0  
max manhours (h) 9 . 0  9 . 0  9 . 0  9 . 0  9 . 0  
m i n  manhours ( h ) 2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0  
i n i t ia l  cos t ( c0 )  1 6 . 2 5  2 . 3  2 0 . 1 3 2 7 . 8 7 , 7 .  8 9 
g roup c o s t ( c
,
) 7 . 0  7 . 0  7 . 0  7 . 0  7 . 0  
s l i p c o s t ( c s 1 0 . 0  1 0 . 0  1 0 . 0  1 0 . 0  , 0 .  0
in-f l i g h t  cos t ( C f ) 5 . 0  s . o  s . o  5 . 0  5 . 0  
max o pe ra t ing pe r iods ( o ) 1 .  0 1 .  0 1 .  0 1 .  0 , . 0 
m i n  deve l o pmen t t ime (0 ) 1 .  0 1 .  0 1 .  0 1 .  0 1 . 0 
p robab i l i ty o f  s l i p . 1 s . 1 5 . 1 s . 1 5 . 1 5 
p robab i l i ty o f m i s hap (a ) . 5 1 .  0 . 2 5 . 5 . 3 5 
i n i t ia l  mas s ( mo ) o . o  o . o  o . o 0 . 0  0 . 0  
p r ima ry mass 1 1 .  0 o . o  2 9 . 0  1 7 .  0 1 5 . 0
p i  f oo t (Jt) 3 4 . 0  3 4 . o · 3 4 . 0  3 4 . 0  3 4 . 0 
max ma s s  (iii ) 6 . 0 6 . 0  6 . 0  6 . 0 6 . 0  
min mas s ( !!! ) 0 . 0  0 . 0  o . o  0 . 0  0 . 0  
* Deno t e s  o p t ima l  des ign
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S u b j e c t 4 * 
A B c D E 
a u t oma t ion ( a ) 4 . 0  2 .  0 4 . 0 0 . 0 b .  0 
d u rab i l i ty ( d ) 3 . 0 , 2 .  0 , 2 .  0 o . o 1 2 . 0
m i s ha p  revenue ( yo ) . 6 5 . 6 5 • 6 5 . 6 5 • b 5 
ne t a  ( n ) - . i 6 - . 7 6 - . 7 6 - . 7 6 - . 7 6 
a u t oma t ion ma s s  ( ma ) 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 0
d u ra b i l i ty ma s s  ( md ) . 2 . 2 . 2 • 2 . 2 
g amma 3 . 8 . 8 • 8 . 8 . 8 
a l pha 1 1 7 .  8 9 1 7 . 8 9 1 7 . 8 9 1 .  0 0 1 7 .  8 9
g amma 1 1 .  5 7 1 . 5 7 1 .  5 7 . 1 4 1 .  5 7 
a l pha 2 5 . 5 4 5 . 5 4 5 .  5 4 5 .  5 4  5 .  5 4 
g amma 2 • 6 , . 6 1 • 6 1 . 6 1 . 6 1 
g amma 4 . 1 7 . , 7 • , 7 . 0 0 . 1 7 
c m  3 . 8 0 3 . 8 0 3 . 8 0 . 2 0 3 . 8 0 
a u t oma t ion c o s t ( c8 ) 4 . 4 2 4 . 4 2 4 . 4 2 4 . 4 2 4 . 4 2 
durab i l i ty c o s t ( cd ) . 2 8 . 2 8 . 2 8 . 2 8 . 2 8 
b a c kup manhours ( bh ) 3 . 0 3 . 0 3 . 0 3 . 0 3 . 0
bac kup mass ( bm ) 2 4 . 0 2 4 . 0 2 4 . 0 2 4 . 0 2 4 . 0
max powe r (p) 6 . 0 6 . 0 6 . 0 6 . 0 6 . 0 
min powe r (E ) _ 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 0 
max manhours ( h ) 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0
m i n  manhours ( h ) 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0
i n i t ia l cos t ( c0 ) 1 8 . 5 2 1 2 . 2 0 2 1 . 0 4 2 . 5 0 2 9 . 8 8
g roup cos t ( c
,
) 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 .  0 s .  0 
s l i p c o s t C c s 1 2 . 0 1 2 . 0 1 2 . 0 1 2 . 0 1 2 .  0 
in- f l ig h t  c o s t ( c f ) 5 . 0 s . o s . o s . o 5 . 0
max o pe ra t ing pe r iods ( o ) 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 0
m i n  deve lopmen t  t ime (0 ) 1 .  0 1 .  0 1 .  0 1 .  0 1 .  0
p robab i l i ty o f s l i p . s . s . s . 5 . s 
p ro bab i l i ty o f mi s hap (o ) • 3 s • 1 4 • 1 4 1 .  0 • 1 4
i n i t ia l  ma s s  ( m0 ) 0 . 0 o . o o . o 0 . 0 o . o
p r imary ma s s  9 . 0 7 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 5 . 0 
p i  f o o t  {Jr )  3 3 . 0 3 3 . 0 3 3 . 0 3 3 . 0 3 3 . 0
max ma s s  (iii ) 1 2 . 0 1 2 . 0 1 2 . 0 9 . 0 1 2 .  0
min ma s s  (!!! ) 0 . 0 o . o o . o o . o 0 . 0
*Deno t e s  op t ima l  des i gn
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S ub j e c t 5 • 
A B c D E 
a u t o ma t i o n  ( a ) 2 . 0 4 .  0 o . o 0 .  5 2 . 0 
d u r ab i l i t y ( d ) 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 2 0 . U
m i s ha p  r e ve nue ( yo ) • 8 • 8 . 8 • 8 . 8 
n e t a ( n ) - . 4 5  - . 4 5 - . 4 5 - . 4 5 - . 4 5 
a u t oma t i o n ma s s  ( ma ) 1 .  0 1 .  0 1 . 0 1 .  0 , . 0 
d u ra b i l i t y mas s ( md ) . 1 • 1 . 1 . , • 1 
g amma 3 . s . s . 5 . s . 5 
a l pha l 5 . 3 7 5 . 3 7 1 .  0 0 5 .  3 7 5 . 3 7 
g amma l . 5 3 . s 3 . 1 4 . 5 3 . 5 3 
a l p ha 2 2 9 . 7 3 2 9 . 7 3 2 9 . 7 3 2 9 . 7 3 2 9 . 7 3 
g arruna 2 2 . 8 3 2 . 8 3 2 . 8 3 2 . 8 3 2 . 8 3 
g amma 4 . 2 9 . 2 9 . 0 0 • 2 9 . 2 9 
cm 4 . 4 3 4 . 4 3 . 2 0 4 . 4 3  4 .  4 3 
au t oma t ion cos t C ea > 2 4 . 6 4 2 4 . 6 4 2 4 . 6 4 2 4 . 6 4 2 4 . 6 4
durab i l i t y c o s t ( cd ) . 0 3 . 0 3 . 0 3 . 0 3 . 0 3 
bac kup manhours ( bh ) 3 .  0 3 . 0 3 . 0 3 . 0 3 .  0 
b a c kup ma s s  ( bm )  1 2 . 0 , 2 .  0 1 2 .  0 1 2 .  0 1 2 .  0 
max powe r (p) 4 . 0 4 . 0 4 . 0 4 . 0 4 . 0
min powe r C e > 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0
max manhours (h ) 6 . 0 6 . 0 6 . 0 6 . 0 6 . 0
m i n  manhours ( h ) o . o 0 . 0 o . o 0 . 0 0 . 0
i n i t ia l  cos t (c0 ) 4 9 . 5 8 9 9 . 2 0 2 . 3 1 2 . 9 2 4 9 . 8 8
g roup c o s t ( c, ) 7 .  5 7 . 5  7 .  5 7 . s 7 . 5 
s l i p  c o s t ( c s 9 . 0 9 . 0 9 . 0 9 . 0 9 . 0
in-f l i g h t  c o s t ( c f ) 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 5 .  0 5 .  0 
max o p e r a t ing pe r iods  ( o ) 1 .  0 1 .  0 1 .  0 1 .  0 , . 0 
min deve l o pmen t t ime ( 0 ) 1 .  0 1 .  0 1 .  0 1 .  0 1 .  0
p robab i l i ty o f  s l i p 
• 3 3 . 3 3 . 3 3 . 3 3 . 3 3 
p robab i l i ty o f  m i s ha p  ( a ) . 3 3 . 2 5 1 .  0 0 . 2 5 . 2 5 
i n i t i a l mas s ( m0 )  0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 o . o 0 . 0
p r imary mas s 2 . 0 6 . 0 o . o 3 . 0 4 . 0
p i  f o o t (!_) 3 7 . 0 ' 3 7 . 0 3 7 . 0 3 7 . 0 3 7 . 0
max mas s (ii) 8 . 0 8 . 0 9 . 0 8 . 0 8 . 0
min mas s <!! > o . o o . o 0 . 0 o . o 0 . 0
*Deno t e s  o p t imal des ign
5 4  
S ub j e c t  6 * 
A B c D E 
a u t oma t ion ( a )  4 .  0 4 . 0 1 .  5 4 .  0 0 . 0  
d urab i l i t y ( d )  4 . 0 8 . 0  4 . 0  1 6 . 0  0 . 0  
m i s ha p  revenue ( yo ) . 9 . 9 . 9 . 9 . 9 
ne ta  ( n )  - . s - • 5 - . 5 - . 5 - . 5 
a u t oma t i on mas s ( ma ) 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0  
d ur ab i l i ty mas s ( md ) . 2 5 . 2 5 . 2 5 . 2 5 . 2 5 
g amma 3 • 6 • 6 . 6 . 6 . 6 
a l pha l 5 . 9 3 5 . 9 3 5 . 9 3 5 .  9 3 1 .  0 0
ganmia l . 3 7 . 3 7 . 3 7 . 3 7 . 1 4 
a l pha 2 1 0 .  9 1  1 0 .  9 1 1 0 .  9 1  1 0 .  9 1  1 0 .  9 1 
gamma 2 . 8 2  . 8 2 . 8 2 . 8 2 . 8 2 
g amma 4 . 9 2 . 9 2 . 9 2 . 9 2  . 0 0 
cm 1 3 . 3 0 1 3 . 3 0 1 3 . 3 0 1 3 . 3 0 . 2 0 
a u toma t ion c o s t C ea > 9 . 0 7 9 . 0  9 . 0 7 9 . 0 7 9 . 0 7 
d urab i l i t y c o s t C e d > • , 6 . 1 6  • , 6 • , 6 . 1 6 
bac kup manhours ( b h ) 3 . 0  3 . 0  3 . 0  3 . 0  3 . 0  
bac kup ma s s  ( bm ) 1 1 .  0 1 1 .  0 1 1 .  0 1 1 .  0 , , . 0 
max powe r (p ) 5 . 0  5 . 0  5 . 0  s . o  5 . 0  
m i n  powe r ( E, ) 2 . 0 2 . 0 2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0  
max manhours (h ) 6 . 0  6 . 0 6 . 0  6 . 0  6 . 0  
m in manho u r s  ( h ) 2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0 2 .  0
i n i t ia l  c o s t ( c0 ) 3 6 . 9 2 3 7 . 5 6 1 4  . 2 5 3 8 . 8 4 2 . 3 2 
g roup c o s t ( c, ) 9 . 0 9 . 0  9 . 0  9 . 0  9 . 0  
s l i p c o s t ( c s 1 2 . 0 1 2 .  0 1 2 . 0  1 2 .  0 1 2 .  0 
in-f l i gh t c o s t ( C f ) 5 . 0  s . o  s . o  s . o  5 .  0 
max o p e ra t ing pe r iods  ( o ) 1 .  0 1 .  0 1 .  0 1 .  0 1 . 0 
min deve l o pmen t  t ime ( 0 ) 2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0 2 . 0 
p r o ba b i l i ty o f  s l i p . 2 5 . 2 5 . 2 5 . 2 5 . 2 5 
p robab i l i ty o f  m i s ha p  ( o ) . 4 s • 3 3 . 4 5 . 2 5 1 .  0 
i n i t ia l mas s ( mo ) 0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  o . o  0 . 0  
p r ima ry mas s 9 . 0  1 0 . 0  4 . 0  1 2 . 0  0 . 0  
p i  f oo t  (J[,) 4 2 . 0  4 2 . 0  4 2 . 0  4 2 . 0  4 2 . 0  
max ma s s  (iii ) 8 . 0  8 . 0  8 . 0  8 . 0  9 . 0  
min ma s s  <!!! ) 0 . 0  0 . 0  o . o  0 . 0 0 . 0  
*Deno t e s  o p t ima l  de s i g n
5 5 
S ub j e c t 7 *
 
A B c D E 
au t oma t ion ( a ) , . 0 1 .  0 
, • 0 , . 0 1 . a 
dur ab i l i t y ( d ) 5 0 . 0 a . o
1 a . a s o . a  1 0 . 0 
m i s ha p  r e venue ( yo ) . 7 5 .
 7 5 . 7 5 . 8 5 . 8 5 
ne ta  ( n ) - . 5 
- . s - . 5 - . s - . s 
a u t oma t i on ma s s ( ma ) 0 . 0 o .
o  o . o 0 . 0 a . o  
d ur ab i l i ty ma s s ( md ) . , 
. 1 . 1 . , • 1 
g amma 3 . 6 • 6 
. 6 . 6 . 6 
a l p ha l 2 . 7 5 2 . 7 5
 2 . 7 5 2 . 6 a 2 . 6 0 
g amma l . 2 5 . 2 5 
. 2 5 . , 5 • , 5 
a l p ha 2 3 . 7 a 3 . 7 0 
3 . 7 a 3 . 6 a 3 . 6 0 
g amma 2 . 5 . 5 
. 5 . 3 . 3 
gamma 4 . o a . a a 
. a o . c o . 0 0
cm . 2 0 . 2 0  
. 2 0 . 2 0 . 2 0 
automa t ion cos t ( c a ) 2 . 0 7 2 . 0 7
 2 . 0 7 2 . 0 7 2 . 0 7 
durab i l i ty cos t ( c d ) . 0 ,  . 0 ,  
. 0 1 . 0 , . 0 ,  
b a c kup manhours ( b h ) 2 . 0 2 . 0  
2 . 0  2 . 0  2 . 0 
b a c kup mas s (bm ) 4 . 0 4 . 0
4 . 0 4 . 0 4 .  0 
max powe r (p)  4 . 0 4 . 0
4 .  0 4 .  0 4 . 0
m i n powe r < 2 >  o . a o . o
o . o  a . o a . a  
max manhours (h ) 4 . 0 4 . 0
4 . 0 4 . 0 4 . 0 
mi n  manhours ( h ) o . o o . o
o . o  0 .  0 o . o
i n i t ia l  co s t ( c0 ) 2 . 5 7 2 . 0 7 
2 .  1 7 2 . 5 i 2 . 1 7 
g roup c os t ( c ,
) s . o s . o  s . o  5 .  0 
5 . 0 
s l i p co s t ( c s 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 
1 0 . 0 1 0 .  0 1 0 .  0 
in- f l igh t co s t ( c f ) s . o  5 . 0  
5 . 0  5 .  0 s . o 
max ope ra t ing pe r iods ( o ) 1 .  0 1 .  0 
1 .  0 1 . 0 1 .  0 
min deve l o pmen t t ime ( 0 ) , . 0 1 .  0
1 .  0 1 .  0 1 . 0 
p robab i l i ty o f  s l i p  • 1 • 1
• 1 . 1 . , 
p robab i l i ty o f  mishap (O' ) . 1 s 1 .  0 
. 3 0 . , s . 3 0 
i n i t ia l  ma s s  <mo > 0 . 0 o . o  
o . o o . o  o . o 
p r imary ma s s s . o  o . o
1 .  0 5 . 0 1 .  0 
p i  f oo t w � s . o  4 5 . 0
4 5 . 0 4 5 . 0 4 5 . a
max mas s (iii ) 9 . 0 9 . 0
9 . 0 9 . 0  9 . 0  
min mas s  <m > o . o o � o
o . o o . o  a . a  
*Deno t e s o p t imal des ign 
5 6  
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Subject 6 
PROJECT LIST
1 .  PROJECT: A B c D E 
2. PRIMARY MASS: 9 10 4 1 2  0 
3. PROBABll.ITY OF MISHAP: 0.45 0.33 0.45 0.25 1 .00 
4. REQUIRED BACKUP TO RECOVER FROM
MISHAP:
MANHOURS: 3 3 3 3 3 
OR
MASS: 1 1  1 1  1 1  1 1  1 1  
5. MAX OPERATING TIME (PERIODS): 1 1 1 1 1 
6. DEVELOPMENT TIME (PERIODS) 2 2 2 2 2 
7. INITIAL COST: 36.92 37.56 14.25 38.84 2.32 
8. DEVELOPMENT COST (PER PERIOD) : 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 
9. PROBABll.ITY OF ONE PERIOD DELAY 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
10. SPEED-UP COST: 12.00 12.00 1 2.00 12.00 1 2.00 
11. IN-FLIGHT GROUND COST (PER PERIOD) 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
MASS REVENUE SHEET
PROJECfS: A,B,c,D PROJECT E 
MASS ADDmONAL TOTAL ADDmONAL TOTAL 
UNIT Re VENUE REVENUE REVENUE 
1 12.38 12.38 0.20 0.20 
2 10.54 22.92 0.20 0.40 
3 8.70 31.62 0.20 0.60 
4 6.86 38.48 0.20 0.80 
5 5.02 43.50 0.20 1.00 
6 3.18 46.68 0.20 1 .20 
7 1.34 48.02 0.20 1 .40 
8 0.00 48.02 0.20 1.60 
9 0.00 48.02 0.20 1.80 
1 0  0.00 48.02 0.00 1.80 
1 1  0.00 48.02 0.00 1 .80 
12 0.00 48.02 0.00 1.80 
13 0.00 48.02 0.00 1 .80 
1 4 0.00 48.02 0.00 1 .80 
15 0.00 48.02 0.00 1 .80 
16 0.00 48.02 0.00 1 .80 
1 7  0.00 48.02 0.00 1 .80 
18 0.00 48.02 0.00 1.80 
19 0.00 48.02 0.00 1 .80 
20 0.00 48.02 0.00 1 .80 
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H 
0 
u 
R 
s 
0 
2 
3 
4 
5 
(j 
0 
2 
3 
� 
5 
6 
0 
0 . 00 5 2 . 3 8  
8 4 . 5 9  
8 4 . 5 9  1 0 . 3 8  
1 5 . 6 5  
1 00 . 2 ,  1 0 . 3 8  
1 1 . 8 8  
1 1 2 . 1 2  1 0 . 3 8
8 . 1 1  
1 2 0 . 2 3  1 0 . 3 8  
4 . 3 4 
1 2 .( . 5 7  1 0 . 3 8  
0 
0 . 0 0  5 1 .34 
8 0. 3 3  
8 0 . S S  9.34 
1 4. 0 8  
94 . 4 2  9 . 3 4  
1 0 . 69 
1 0 5 . 1 0  9.34 
7 . 30 
1 1 2 . 4 0  9 . 34' 
3 . 9 1 
1 1 6 . S l 9 . 3 4  
S u bj e c t 6
P r oj e c t  A
N O R M A L  REV EN U E TA B L E
P O W E R 
2 3 " 
5 2 . 3 8  4 .0 8 5 6 . 4 6 3 . 34 6 9 . 8 0  
4 2 . 5 9  4 2 . 5 9  4 2 . 5 9  
9 4 . 9 1  4 . 0 8  9 Q . 0 5  3 . 34 1 0 2 . 3 9  
1 5 . 6 5  1 5 . 6 5  1 5 .65  
1 10 . 6 2  4 . 0 8 1 1 , . 7 0 3 . 34 1 1 8 .0 ,  
1 1 . 8 8  1 1 . 8 8  1 1 . 8 8  
1 2 2 . 5 0  4 .0 8 1 2 6 . 5 8  3 . 34 1 2 9 . 9 2  
8 . 1 1 � 8 . 1 1 8 . 1 1  
1 3 0 . 6 1  4 .0 8  l S , . 6 9  3 . 34 1 3 8 . 0 3  
4 . 3 4 4 . 3 4 4 . 3 4  
1 3 4 . 9 5  4 . 0 8  1 3 9 .0 S  3 . 34 1 4 2 . S T  
MIS HAP REVEN U E  TA BLE
P 0 W E R 
2 3 .c 
5 1 . S '  3 .67 5 5 .0 1  3 . 0 1  5 8 .0 2  
3 8 . 3 3  3 8 . 3 3 3 8 . 3 3  
8 9 . 6 8  3 .6 7  9 S . S 5  3 . 0 1  9 6 . S S  
1 4 . 0 8  1 4 .0 8  1 4 .08 
1 0 S . T 6 3 . 6 7  1 0 T . 4 S  3 . 0 1  1 1 0 . .( 4
1 0 . 69 1 0 .69 1 0 .69 
1 14 . 4 5  3 . 6 7  1 1 s . 1 :  3 .0 1  1 2 1 . 1 2
7 . 30 7 .3 0  7 .30 
1 2 1 . 7 5 3 . 67 1 2 5 .• 2  3 . 0 1  1 2 8 .4 2
3 . 9 1 3 .9 1 3 .9 1  
1 2 5 . 6 5  3 . 6 7 1 2 9 . S S  3 .0 1 1 S 2 . S S  
5 8  
5 
2 . 60 6 2 . 4 0  
4 2 . 5 9  
2 . 6 0  1 0 4 . 9 9  
1 5 . 6 5  
2 . 60 1 2 0 . 6 4  
1 1 . 8 8  
2 . 60 1 3 2 . 5 2 
8 . 1 1  
2 . 60 1 4 0 . 6 3  
4 . 3 4  
2 . 60 1 4 4 . 9 1  
5 
2 . 3 4  6 0 . 3 6  
3 8 . 3 3  
2 . 34 9 8 . 6 9  
1 4 .0 8
2 . 3 4  1 1 2 . 1 8 
1 0 .69 
2 . 3 4 1 2 3 . 4 6  
7 . 3 0  
2 . 3 4  l S 0 . 7 6 
3 . 9 1 
2 . 3 4  1 S 4 . 6 T  
M 
A 
N 
H 
0 
u 
R 
s 
M 
A 
N 
H 
0 
u 
R 
s 
0 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
0 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
0 
0 . 00 5 2 . 3 8  
8 4 . 5 9  
8 4 . 5 9  1 0 . 3 8  
1 5 . 6 5  
1 00 . 2 4  1 0 . 3 8  
1 1 . 8 8  
1 1 2 . 1 2  1 0 . 3 8  
8 . 1 1
1 2 0 . 2 S  1 0 . 3 8  
4 . 3 4 
1 2 4 . 5 1 1 0 . 3 8 
0 
0 . 00 5 1 . 3 4  
8 0. 3 3  
8 0 . 3 3  9 . 3 4  
1 4 .08 
94 . 4 2  9 . 3 4  
1 0. 6 9  
1 0 5 . 1 0 9 . 3 4  
7 . 30
1 1 2 . 40 9 . 3 4  
3 . 9 1 
1 1 6 . S l 9 . 3 4  
S ubj e c t  6
P r oj ec t  B
N O RMAL REV EN U E  TAB L E
P 0 W E R 
2 
5 2 . 3 8  4 .08  
4 2 . 5 9  
9 4 . 9 7 4 . 08
1 5 . 6 5  
1 1 0 . 6 2 4 .0 8  
1 1 . 8 8  
1 2 2 . 5 0  4 .08 
8 . 1 1
1 3 0 . 6 1  4 .08
4 . 3 4
1 3 4 . 9 5 4' .08 
3 
5 6 . 4 6  3 . 34 
42 . 5 9  
9 9 . 0 5  3 . 34 
1 5 .6 5  
1 1 4 . 1 0  3 . 34 
1 1 . 8 8  
1 2 6 . 5 8  3 . 34 
8 . 1 1  
1 3 4 .6 9  3 . 34 
4 . 3 4  
1 3 9 . 0 S  3 . 34 
MIS HAP REVENUE TABLE
P 0 W E R 
2 3 
6 1. 3 4  3 . 67 5 5 .0 1 3 .0 1  
3 8 . 3 3  3 8 . 3 3  
8 9 . 6 8  3 .67 9 S . S 5 3 . 0 1  
1 4 . 08 1 4 .08 
1 0 3 . 7 6  3 .6 7  1 0 1 . 4 S 3 . 0 1  
10 .69 10 .69 
1 1 4 . 4 5  3 .67 1 1 8 . 1 2 3 .0 1  
7 . 3 0  7 . 3 0  
1 2 1 . 7 5  3 . 6 7  1 2 5 . 4 2 3 . 0 1  
3 . 9 1 3 .9 1  
1 2 5 . 6 5  3 . 67  1 2 9 . 3 3 3 . 0 1  
5 9  
4 
5 9 . 8 0  
4 2 . 5 9  
10 2 . 3 9  
1 5 .6 5  
1 125 .04 
1 1 . 8 8  
1 2 9 . 9 2  
8 . 1 1  
1 3 8 .p s  
4 . 34 
1 4 2 . 3 1  
4 
5 8 .0 2  
3 8 . 3 3  
9 6 . 3 5  
1 4 .08 
1 10 . 44 
1 0.69 
1 2 1 . 1 2  
7 . 30
1 2 8 .4 2  
3 .9 1 
1 3 2 . 3 3  
5 
2 . 60 6 2 . 4 0
4 2 . 5 9  
2 . 6 0  1 0 4 . 9 9  
1 5 .6 5  
2 . 60  1 2 0 . 6 4
1 1 . 8 8  
2 . 60 1 3 2 . 5 2  
8 . 1 1
2 . 60 1 4 0 . 6 3  
4 . 3 4 
2 . 6 0  1 4 4 . 9 7
5 
2 . 3 4 6 0 . 8 6  
3 8 . 3 3  
2 . 3 4 9 8 . 6 9  
1 4 . 0 8  
2 . 34 1 1 2 . 7 8
1 0 .69
2 . 3 4  1 2 3 . 4 6  
7 . 30 
2 . 3 4  1 3 0 . 7 6  
3 .9 1  
2 . 3 4  1 3 4 . 6 7  
M 
A 
tJ 
H 
0 
u 
R 
s 
M 
'A 
N 
H 
0 
u 
R 
s 
0 
2 
3 
4 
5 
G 
0 
2 
3 
4 
5 
(j 
0 
0 . 0 0 5 2 . 3 8  
6 5 . 6 5  
0 5 . 0 5  10 . 3 8  
8 . 69 
7 4 . 3 3  1 0 . 3 8  
6 . 5 9
8 0 . 9 3  1 0 . 3 8  
4 . 5 0  
8 5 . 4 3  1 0 . 3 8  
2 . 4 1  
8 1 . 8 4  1 0 . 3 8  
0 
U .00 5 1 .34  
6 3 . 2 8  
6 3 . 2 8  9 . 34 
7 . 82 
T l . 1 0  9 . 3 4  
5 .93 
7 7 . 0 3  9 . 34 
4 .05 
8 1 .09 9 . 34 
2 . 1 7 
8 3 . 2 5  9 . 34 
S u bj e c t  6
Proj ec t  C
N O RMAL REV EN U E  TAB L E
P 0 W E R 
2 3 4 
6 2 . 8 6  4 . 0 8  6 6 . 4. 6 3 . 3 4  6 9 . 8 0  
2 3 . 65 23 .65 2 3 . 6 5  
'1 6 . 0 3  4 .0 8  80 . 1 1  3 . 3 4  8 3 . • 5  
8 . 69 8 . 69 8 . 69 
8 4 .  7 1 4 .0 8  8 8 . 7 9  3 . 3 4  9 2 . 1 3  
6 . 59 6 . 59 6. 5 9  
9 1 . 3 1  4 .0 8  9 5 . 3 9  3 . 3 4 9 8 . 7 3 
4 . 50 4 . 50 4 . 50 
9 5 . 8 1  4 .08 99 . 8 9  3 . 3 4 1 03 . 2 3  
2 . 4 1  2 . 4 1 2 . 4 1 
9 8 . 2 2  4 .08 10 2 . 3 0 3 .3 4 1 0 5 . 6 4  
MIS HAP R EVE N UE TAB L E
P 0 W E R 
2 3 4 
6 1 . 3 ,  3 .67  6 5 . 0 1  3 .0 1  6 8 .02 
2 1 . 2 8  2 1 . 28  2 1 . 28 
7 2 . 6 2  3 . 67 7 0 . 3 0  3 .0 1  7 9 . SO 
7 . 8 2  7 . 82 7 . 82 
s o  . .  ,, 3 . 67 8 4 . 1 1  3 .0 1 8 1 . 12
5 . 93 5 . 93 5 . 93 
8 6 . 3 8 3 .67 90 . 0 5  3 .0 1 9 3 . 0 5  
4.05 4 .05 4.05 
9 0 . 4 3  3 . 6 7  9 , , 1 0 3 .0 1  9 1 . 1 1
2 . 1 7  2 . 1 7 2 . 17 
9 2. 0 0  3 . 67  96 .27  3 .0 1  9 9 . 2 7
6 0  
5 
2 . 60 0 2 . 4 0  
2 3 . 6 5  
2 . 60 8 6 . 0 5  
8 . 6 9  
2 .60 9 4 . 7 3  
6 . 5 9  
2 .60 1 0 1 . 3 3  
4 . 5 0
2 . 60 1 0 5 . 8 3  
2 . 4 1 
2 .60 1 0 8 . 2 4  
,i; 
2 . 3 4 6 0 . 3 6  
2 1 . 2 8  
2 . 3 4  8 1 . 6 4  
7 . 82 
2 . 34 8 9 . 4 0  
5 . 93 
2.34 9 5 . 3 9  
4 . 0.5 
2 .34 9 9 . 4 5  
2 . 1 7  
2 . 3 4 1 0 1 . 0 1 
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0 
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N 
n 
0 
u 
R 
s 
0 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
0 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
0 
0 . 0 0  5 2 . 3 8  
8 4 . 5 9  
8 4 . 5 9  1 0 . 3 8  
1 5 . 6 5  
1 00 . 2 4  1 0 . 3 8  
1 1 . 8 8 
1 1 2 . 1 2  1 0 . 3 8  
8 . 1 1  
1 2 U . 2 S  1 0 . 3 8  
4 . 3 4 
1 2 4 . 5 1  1 0 . 3 8  
0 
0 . 00 5 1 . 3 4  
80. 3 3  
8 0 . S S  9 . 3 4  
1 4 .08 
9 4 . 4 2  9.34 
10.69 
1 0 5 . 1 0  9 . 3 4  
7 . 30 
1 1 2 . 40 9.34  
3 . 9 1 
1 1 6 . S l  9 . 3 4  
S ubj e c t 6 
I' 1 oj ec: t  D 
NO R MA L  REVENU E TA B L E
P 0 W E R 
2 3 4 
5 2 . :S S  4 .0 8  5 6 . 4 6  3 . 34 5 9 . 8 0  
4 2 . 5 9 4 2 .5 9 4 2 . 5 9 
9 4 . 9 1  4 .0 8  9 9 . 0 5  3 . 34' 1 0 2 . :S 9  
1 5 . 6 5  1 5 .6 5  1 5 .6 5 
1 10 . 6 2  4 .0 8  1 1 4 . '7 0  3 . 34 1 1 ! . 0 4  
1 1 . 8 8  1 1 . 8 8  1 1 . 8 8  
1 2 2 . 5 0 4 .0 8  1 2 6 . 5 8  3 . 34 1 2 9 .9 2  
8 . 1 1  8 . 1 1 8 . 1 1 
l S 0 . 6 1 4 .0 8  1 3 4 .69 3 . 34 1 3 8 . 0 S  
4' . 3 4  4 . 3 4'  4 . 34'  
1 3 4 . 9 5  4' .08 1 3 9 .0 S  3 . 34 1 4 2 . : n  
MIS HAP R EVENUE TABLE
P 0 W E R 
z 3 4 
5 1 . S 4  3 .67 6 5 .0 1  3 .0 1  6 8 .0 2  
3 8 . 3 3  3 8 .33 3 8 . 3 3  
8 9 . 6 8  3 .67 9 a . a &  3 .0 1 96 . 3 5  
1 4 . 0 8  1 4 .08 1 4 .08 
1 0 3 . 7 6  3 .6 7  1 0 7 . 4 3 3 .0 1 1 1 0 . , , 
1 0 . 6 9  1 0 .69 10 .69 
1 1 4 . 4 5  3 . 6 7  1 1 8 . 1 2  3 . 0 1  1 2 1 . 1 2  
7 . 3 0  7 .30 7 . 30 
1 2 1 . '7 5 3 .67 1 2 5 .4 2  3 .0 1 1 2 8 .4 2
3 . 9 1 3 .9 1 3 .9 1  
1 2 5 . 6 5  3 . 6 7  1 2 9 . S S  3 . 0 1  l S :Z . S S  
61 
5 
2 . 60 6 2 . 4 0  
4 2 . 5 9  
2 . 60 1 0 4 . 9 9  
1 5 . 6 5  
2 . 60 1 2 0 . 6 •  
1 1 . 8 8  
2 . 60 1 3 2 . 6 2  
8 . 1 1 
2 . 60 1 4 0 . 6 3  
4 . 3 4  
2 . 60 1 4 4 .9 1  
5 
2. 3 4  0 0 . 3 6  
3 8 . 3 3  
2 . 3 4  9 8 . 0 9  
1 4 . 0 8  
2 . 3 4  1 1 2 . "1 8  
1 0 .6 9  
2 . 3 4  1 2 3 . 4 6  
7 . 3 0  
2 . 3 4  1 3 0 . 1 6  
3 . 9 1  
2 . 3 4  1 3 • . 0 T  
M 
A 
N 
H 
0 
u 
R 
s 
M 
A 
H 
H 
0 
u 
R 
s 
0 
2 
3 
" 
5 
6 
-
a 
2
3 
4 
5 
6 
0 
•'2 . UU l . 4 4  
0 . 00
4 2 . 0 0  1 . 4 4  
0. 00
4 2 . 0 0  1 . 4 4  
0 . 00 
4 2 . 0 0  l . 4 4  
0 . 00 
4 2 . 0 0  l . 4 4  
0 . 00 
4 2 . 0 0  l . ·44 
o ·
4 2 .00 1 .30
0.00 
4 2 .00 1 .30
0.00 
4 2 .00 1 . 3 0  
0.00 
4 2 . 00 1 . 3 0  
0.00 
4 2 . 00 1 . 3 0  
0 . 00
4 2 . 00 1 . 3 0  
S u bj e c t 6
P r oj ec t  E
NO R M A L  REV ENU E TAB L E
P 0 W E R 
2 3 
4 3 . 4 4  0 . 3 0  4 S . 7 4  0 . 0 2  
0 . 00  0 .00 
4 S . 4 4 0 . 3 0 4 S . 1 4  0 . 0 2  
0 . 00  0 . 00 
4 3 . 44 0 . 3 0  4 S . 1 '  0.02  
0 . 00  0 .00 
4 3 . 4 4 0 . 3 0  4 S .'1 4 0.02 
0 . 00  0 .00
4 3 . 44 0 . 3 0  4 3 . 1 4  0.02 
0 .00 0 . 00 
4 3 . 4 4  0 . 3 0  4 3 .1 4 0 .02  
MIS HAP REVENUE TABLE
P 0 W E R 
2
4 S . 3o 0 .2 7
0.00 
4 3 . SO 0 .2 7  
0 .00 
4 3 . S O  0 . 2 7  
0 . 00  
4 S . SO 0 . 2 7  
0 . 00  
4 S . SO 0 . 2 7  
0 .00
4 S . S O 0 . 2 7  
3
4 S . 5 T  
0.00 
4 S .5 T  
0.00 
4 S . 5 T  
0 .00 
4 S . 5 '1  
0 .00
• S . 5 1
0 .00
4 S . 5 '1  
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0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
.. 5 
4 S . T 6  0 . 00 .( 3 . 7 0
0 .00 0 .00 
4 3 .1 6  0 . 00 4 S . 1 6
0 .00 0 . 00 
4 S . '1 6  0 .00 4 3 . 1 6  
0 .00 0 .00 
4 S . 7 6 0 . 00 4 3 . 1 6  
0.00 0 .00 
4 3 . 1 8  0 . 00 4 S . 1 6  
0 .00 0 .00 
43 . '1 6  0.00 4 3 . 1 6  
" 5 
4 3 . 5 9  0.00 4 S . 5 8  
0.00 0 . 00 
4 3 . 5 8  0.00 4 S . 5 8
0.00 0 . 00 
4 S . 5 8  0.00 4 3 . 5 8  
0.00 0 . 00 
4 S . 5 8  0 . 00 4 3 . 5 8  
0.00 0 .00 
• 3 . 5 8 0.00 4 S . 5 8  
0 .00 0 .00 
· -
4 S . 5 8  0.00 4 3 . 5 8
APPENDIX B
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AGENDA
Today: Read the enclosed orientation.
Feb. 17 (Wednesday)
8 :00 am meet at Baxter Lecture Hall - Caltech (map enclosed)
8 :05 am instructions and meet with partner
9:00 am begin experiment
1 2:00 noon lunch
1 : 30 pm continue experiment 
afternoon brief break 
6:00 pm try to finish by this time
Feb. 18 (Thursday)
8:00 am
8:30 am
10.00 am
1 1 :00 am
meet at Baxter Lecture Hall - Caltech 
overview of experiment (results)
debrief
futurc plans
12:00 noon lunch
1 :30 pm future plans
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ORIENTATION :  NASAJJPL Personnel 
In order for the upcoming exercise to be successful, we must rely upon you to orient yourself
properly. The instructions enclosed are those that would be read by ordinary subjects. In addition,
the exercise itself is ordinarily designed to focus on only pan of the resource allocation puzzle. 
Since you are neither ordinary subjects nor are you interested in only a piece without seeing the 
whole puzzle,  some special effortS on your pan are required. 
1 .  The siruation is complex but the instructions are accurate and complete.  Resist the temptation
to become overwhelmed and frustrated. Study the material from the i;x>int of view of someone
who has simply been asked to participate in an experiment about which he/she knows nothing.
Fo rget that you really warn to know about resource allocation policies and that you have no
fundamental interest in an experimenL Confusion is expected and perhaps even necessary.
Many questions such as how you get resources, how decisions are made, etc . ,  will be answe red 
when you arrive. Other questions regarding pricing policies will be discussed after the exercise .
2. You have been assigned a partner who can help you with some of the details. This partner is a 
Caltech student whom you will meet when you arrive. He has participated in the experiment
before and is very knowledgeable about the instructional material enclosed. The partner can
explain and answer technical questions but cannot advise you on decisions. All decisions are
yours .
3. The income of your partner depends completely on the decisions you make. When the
instructions refer to "payoffs" and "profits" these all go to your partner. Your success will be
measured in terms of how much you can make for him.
4. Go about this task with an open mind. Don't  try to second-guess the purpose and procedures.
Herc are some examples. 
i. What you will see as unnecessary complexity and redundancy in your particular
experiment results from a need for instructional consistency across a variety of
experiments. The in.muctions in the pack.age are designed to accommodate a very wide
range of experiments by making changes in tables only; 
ii. Don't rely on your knowledge of space station details to get you through this. You can be
misled. The setting was not designed to capitalize on your special knowledge of space
station. 
iii. Don't be confused by the use of money and the concept of payoffs. 'The procedures do not
imply that scientists are motivated by c'5h payoffs or that a major portion of resource
decisiom necessarily have a monetary foundation. 'Ibis method of motivation is
fundamental to a long and successful record of experimental comml. The payoffs give
specific and controlled dllection to the resource allocation conflicts. 
S.  Remember that the Wk is no t  simple and th.II all of the issues will be discussed after the
experiment Read the instructions today so you will have the opportunity for them to "soak in"
and for further review. If you have any questions, call 
Dave Porter (8 1 8) 356-4 156
(8 1 8)  354- 1 286
(8 1 8) 798-0230
65 
Caltech office
IPL office 
home 
APPENDIX C
Instructions
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D. INSTR U CTI O N S 
You are abou t to panicipate in a n experimen t 
designed to provide insights in to certa i n fea tu res of 
decision p rocesses. If you follow the instructions 
carefully and make good decisions yo u  m igh t earn a 
considerable amount of money. You will be paid in 
cash. In order to aid you r  understanding of the 
options you face and the decisions you might make we 
have described an imaginary situation. You will be 
managing projects which might be on a space station 
orbiting the earth. The descriptions of this situation 
are only to aid your understanding about how you 
make money. Beyond that purpose the realism or
lack of it s hould be of no concern to you.
Each of you has been given a large folder. The 
contents of this folder are your private information. 
Do not give this information to any other participant. 
When you finiSh the experiment put everything back 
in your folder and return it to us. Take none of it 
home with you. 
An overview of the experiment will be given
with the aid of the calendar which you will find in 
your folder. The calendar is d ivided into periods and 
interims. At the beginning of each period a launch is 
made to transport projects to a space station. The 
interims are used for the development and selection 
of projects to go on the station and for the operation 
of projects on the station. 
Your first task is to choose from among those
projects described in you r  folder (PROJECI'S FILE). 
After a p roject is chosen you must secure a position 
on the space station (APPLICATION). For this you 
will need transportation to the station and the 
resources (power and manhours) to operate your 
project while it is on the statioQ. The value to you of
operating a project is determined by the length of
time you are operating on the station and the level at 
which your project operates (power and manhours
used). Your costs include initial costs, development
costs, ground costs, transportation costs and resource
costs (power and manhours) incurred while on the 
station. 
Development begins as soon as your project is 
started and can be influenced by chance. Similarly, 
the operations of the station and your own project 
can be influenced by chance. Such events affect you 
either directly through your income or indirectly by 
affecting your level of operation. The reliability of 
projects and station will be discussed in detail la ter. 
You can have only one project operating on the 
sta tion during a period. The station will operate 
many periods, so over time you might operate several 
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diffe r e n t  proJCCt5 o r  even the sa m e  p roj ect ma ny 
t imes. 
We will first describe proj ect ope ra t ion revenues 
and co s ts .  The descrip t ions will  inc lude proj ect 
characterist ics incl uding re l iab i l i ty and the fea t u res o f 
projects tha t are important for success fu l ly opera t i ng
on the s tation. Afterward we will discuss the 
appropriate  accounting procedures. 
The p rojects available to you are fu l ly described 
by the PROJECT LIST and PROJECT RETURN
FROM OPERATIONS TABLES. Each project is 
described by a series of characteristics. Each of these 
characteristics will be explained below. P lease refer  to 
your Project List Sheet. 
The project primary mass is fixed for each
project and is listed on line 2 of your Project List. It
is important because it can affect the costs and the
chance that your project will get to the s tat ion.  
Project Returns from Operations: Associated 
with each project are Project Returns from 
Operations Tables that give the income generated 
each period that a project operates while on the 
station. Consider the table below, as an example of 
such a table. If the project is on the station and if
1 manhour and 2 units of power are used then the
payment to you is 2330 for each period of operation.
If manhours are increased by an hour to 2, then your
payment is increased by 800 to 3130. The amounts in
the parentheses in the table indicate the changes in
the payoffs with one unit increases i n the variables. 
0 l 
a 0 OllOl '!CO I cs:icn IUO ()'(!) U10 I ClCOl I I 'TTO 
.. 
1 1 1ccn 1 I , 1 1 (1)1 
A 
H 
K 
0 
u 
a 
s 
1 1 11111 ( 1 11111 ( l lCIO) 
1 1m (7all) l lDD CUOI lllCI (� mo I r..ccn I U70 
111111 111111 I (IDDl I uccn I I (IQDI
ltcll (7all) um (JlOl J l lCI  ( �  I :1'70 I 1:001 I l'70 
(G) (GI) («II) <Gil I i (.00) 
ma (7all) JmO (SJO) :sna (>«I) Jl'7ll 1 c:ccn I .a70 I
(!Gal (IOlll ( IGal nan I I i ICll  I 
lGI (7GDI >•m !!JOI M30 (>«I) :Jf7ll l r.J:IOl I . , 70 
You have a number of Project Retu rn Tables . 
Initially you will use the Normal Project Ret urn Table 
for the project selected. If  a mishap occurs while the 
project is on the station then you will use the Mishap
Return Table for the project selected. The p robability 
of this occurrence is given in l ine - · While a 
project is on the station a mishap can occu r only for 
the first period it operates on the station.  
Backup systems can be used to prevent  mishaps 
and thus allow you to return to your  i n i t i a l  table. 
Backu p sys te ms can be used for no other  p u rpose. 
The amount  o f  backup necessary to use you r ini tial
Project Return Table should a mishap occur is given 
on line of your Project List. -
Additional mass beyond the p rimary mass i.s 
optional. The effect of additional mass is to increase 
the revenue that the project generates. The revenue 
that you accrue by using additional mass is received 
when your project i.s launched. However, it might be
costly. 
Maximum Operating Time: The number of 
periods that  a project can operate to generate income
is limited. The operating l ife of a project i.s located
on line _ of the Project List. Projects can exist on
the station or the ground for any length of time 
without operating. 
Ground Development Time: Once you stan a 
project you will incur a n  initial cost which you can
find on l ine _ of your Project List. Normal
development time from the project stan is given on 
line _. The development cost per period is given 
on l ine _. O ne period delays can occur with the
probability found on line _ of your Project List. 
Your project can be delayed only once. You can 
speed up the development time of your project by one 
period by incurring the cost found on line _ of 
your Project List. Should the project be idle on the 
ground when it is completed, the development costs 
continue to accrue each period. After you have 
staned a project you can discontinue its development. 
However, you will still incur its initial cost and
development cost for each period including the period 
in which it is •kined• (discontinued).
Ground Operations : While your project is on
the station, in-flight ground costs will be incurred
regardless of the level of operations. This cost can be 
found on line _ of your Project List. 
E. STATION CONTRACTS AND RESOURCES 
Looking back to the calendar you will see that
at interims 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, etc. the resources
available to be allocated at the station for the current 
period are checked and announced. The station's
maximum capacity might be less than the posted
amou n ts. Fo r those on the statio n the priority system
\Nill be used to determine operations levels and
individual operating levels wm be announced . The 
unallocated rated capacities available for the nen
period will be announced.
As will be explained (and demonstrated) later
the station's resources might be less than the rated
ca pacities written on the board. 1f this occurs the
resources will be allocated to priority 1 projects in 
proponion with initial allocations until the full 
allocations are achieved. The remaining resources will 
then be allocated to p riority 2 projects in proponion 
with initial allocations, etc. 
Applications are submitted by completing the 
application form found in your instructions folder. A 
standard form is shown on the chalkboard. Consider 
the following example: 
Participant. __ _ 
Priority 
APPLICATION 
Application Number __ _ 
Project Start Number __ _ 
Launch Pre(en:ncc (Ordered) First Prefc:n:ncc __ _ 
Second Prdcn:na: __ 
Number of Periods on Station -----
Priority 1 
Priority 2 ---
Backup: Priority 1 --­
Priority 2 --­
Priority 1 --­
Priority 2 ---
Total: 
CONSECUTIVE PERIODS ON STATION 
1st 2nd 
Power: 
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Opentiom: Priority l ��� 
Priority 2 __ _ 
�=� �---
Backup: Priority 1 ---
Priority 2 __ _ 
Total: Priority 1 __ _ 
Priority 2 __ _ 
i"'aniapani __ _ 
Apptiation Number ---
Sun Numb __ _ 
Project __ _ PROJECT ACCOUNTING SHEET
(a) primary ma11 _ (b) additional mus __ (c) backup mass _ 
(d) development time _ (c) operating time __ 
(f) initial CCII  -- (I) deYelopment CCII  -- (h) speed-up CCII  -
(i) in-flight ground cmt __ (j) ataning period _ (k) actual development time __ 
(I) prioda aped-up __ (m) project ex>mpletion period __ (n) launch period _ 
(o) period on station __ 
(p) period 
(i) allocated man-boun (priority 1 )  
(priority 2) 
(ii) allocated backup man-hours (priority 1 )  
(priority 1)  
(iii) allocated power (priority 1 )  
(priority 2) 
(iv) allocated additional mass (priority 1 )  
(priority 2) 
(v) actual man-hours (priority 1 )  
(priority 2) 
(vi) actual backup man-hours (priority 1 )  
(priority 2) 
(vii) actual power (priority 1 )  
(priority 2) 
(viii) actual massl (priority 1 )  
(priority 2) 
1 .  Revenue.. ___ -·--· 
(using (v) and (vii )) 
2. Initial COit -----
(from (f)) 
3. Development COIL -·--
(from (g)) 
4. Speed-up COit·--·-·--------··-· 
((h) x (f)) 
s. Launch COits -----·-----
(maas x ____) 
6. Man-hour Cat 
(man-houn) 
7. Power COi 
(powcr x __) 
8. In-flight Ground·--·---·······-········ 
(from (i))
9. Total COit .• ·-··--··---·-··-··-··-·-.. ·-········· 
(2 + 3 + 4 + s + 6 + 7 + 8) 
10. Period Proci···- ---··---·-··-· 
( 1 ·9) 
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